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Chapter 1. Introduction: 
 
This dissertation is a compilation of three essays related with investigation of the impact 
of risk preference on occupational choice, health and happiness.  The motivation behind my 
work are two fundamental questions – what are human beings aiming at (on an average) in 
their lives and whether our life outcomes are affected by our preferences or not. Recent 
surveys/studies find that people are looking for simple things in life like - health, wealth and 
happiness.
1
 To answer the second question this dissertation investigates the impact of risk 
preference on health, wealth and happiness. I adopt a holistic approach towards risk attitude/ 
preference by studying its impact in financial front as well as in health and happiness front. 
Given heterogeneous risk and time preferences of individuals, this dissertation investigates 
the impact of those preferences on sorting into occupations on one front and heterogeneity in 
health state dependence of utility (using happiness as the utility proxy) on the other front.   
Contingent upon the results of existence of racial-ethnic and gender heterogeneity in health 
dependence of utility, this dissertation identifies the contribution of observed factors behind 
the heterogeneity using nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.   
The findings of this study are important because the risk attitude plays a significant role 
not only in the occupational choice but also in the health state dependence of utility and 
happiness level.  What makes this study all the more relevant for labor economics and health 
demography/ health economics literature is the finding that people have behavioral 
inconsistency for health risk as compared to that of financial risk. Based on this finding, this 
                                            
1
 Gallup poll (January, 2004) conducted on teens aged between 13 to 17 also suggests that we aim at simple 
things in life like healthy family, good job and happiness. 
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dissertation advises against the use of risk preference measures based on financial risk 
questions to make inferences about health risk attitude and vice-versa. 
Other than above mentioned, what makes this study stand out from the literature is that the 
literature addresses either the impact of risk preference or that of the time preference 
separately on the occupations but to the best of my knowledge, none of the existing studies 
address the impact of the two preferences jointly on occupations.  Moreover, literature 
addresses the issue of health state dependence of utility but does not address the existence of 
racial, ethnic and gender heterogeneity in health state dependence of utility and well-being 
and it does not study the factors contributing to this heterogeneity. This dissertation addresses 
these two caveats of literature.   
Following are some of the other inadequacies of the literature, which this dissertation 
addresses: 
1. Does not examine the issue of the possibility of people thinking differently about income risk 
versus health risk. 
2. Concentrates mostly on fatal and non fatal injury/illness incidence risk and ignores the 
possibility of various other dimensions of occupational risk. 
3. Mostly occupational risk analysis is done on occupations or industries independently, 
resulting in the same risk rank to all the occupations in the same industry and vice versa with 
an exception of Viscusi‘s 2004 paper, however it takes into account only the fatal injuries. 
4. Studies (Finkelstein et al., 2010) on health dependence of  utility do not investigate how 
racial, ethnic and gender differences impact the preferences which in-turn might lead to 
racial-ethnic and gender heterogeneity in state dependence of utility. 
1.1.  This dissertation fills these gaps in the literature: 
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The current study fills these gaps in the literature by analyzing: 
 First, how the risk and time preference jointly affect the occupational choice by ranking 
occupation-industry cells jointly on three risk dimensions - fatal injury/illness incidence risk, 
nonfatal injury/illness incidence risk, and income variability risk. 
Secondly, it examines the behavioral inconsistency among people towards income risk 
from that of health risk and finds out that this distinction is relevant for future studies. 
Thirdly, this study also examines whether there exists the racial, ethnic and gender 
heterogeneity in the health dependence of utility. 
Last but not least, contingent upon the findings of presence of heterogeneity in health 
dependence of utility, this dissertation examines the factors contributing it and addresses the 
question whether risk preference plays any role in shaping the outcomes of life. 
 
2. Research Question: 
2.1 General Research Question: 
How risk attitude affects the occupational choice, health and happiness? 
2.2 Specific Research Questions: 
1. Whether risk averse and more future oriented subjects get selected into the occupations which 
are comparatively safer and vice versa.  
2. Whether (and if yes, then to what extent) the relation between risk and time preference and 
occupational choice differ in case of income variability risk than from the case of fatal and 
nonfatal incidence risk. 
3. Whether there exist racial, ethnic and gender heterogeneity in health state dependence of 
utility. 
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4. If yes, what factors contribute to this heterogeneity in health dependence of utility?  Is risk 
attitude a significant factor? 
3. Research Material: 
This dissertation uses Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data as the main data source for 
empirical analyses.  Along with HRS, I also use Bureau of labor statistics (BLS) fatal and 
non-fatal injury data and 5% census data from IPUMS as subsidiary datasets.  HRS is a 
nationally representative longitudinal survey started in 1992 and collects data every alternate 
year. This study uses several waves of HRS in order to capture the last recorded risk 
preference variables for each individual starting from 1998 up to 2004. This study excludes 
the AHEAD cohort because of their lower response rates on the current occupational 
questions due to older age; hence much higher rates of their being retired. For health 
dependence of utility, this study uses all the waves of HRS from 1998 to 2008. 
• For occupational risk ranking – BLS data for fatal and non-fatal injury risk and PUMS 
5% Census data for income variability risk.  
• For employment and fatal and non-fatal injury data – BLS data. 
• For gender, racial and ethnic comparisons – HRS data 
• For health conditions  – HRS data 
• For utility (happiness and Center of Epidemiology Study-Depression (CES-D) score) 
– HRS data. 
4. Hypothesis: 
Based on the research questions, this dissertation tests the following four hypotheses: 
1. More risk averse and more future oriented subjects select into less risky occupation. 
2. Hypothesis-1 is applicable for both income risk and health risk. 
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3. Health state dependence of utility varies over race, ethnicity and gender. 
4. Risk attitude affects the health state dependence of the marginal utility and happiness.  
Brief Outline of Three Essays: 
Essay 1: Risk Preference, Time Preference and Occupational Choice 
First essay (Chapter -2) investigates the impact of risk and time preference on 
occupational choice by ranking occupation-industry cells on three risk dimensions - fatal 
injury/illness incidence risk, nonfatal injury/illness incidence risk, and income variability risk. 
Two different risk preference measures have been created in this study – one based on 
financial risk and the other on health risk with the aim to examine whether people behave the 
same way with respect to income risk and health risk.  This study also estimates the validity 
of often used proxy for risk (smoking). 
 Findings of Essay-1 
Occupational risk ranking by cross categorizing jobs on occupation and industry 
verifies our intuition that this  joint ranking is important. The most standout contribution of 
this dissertation is the finding that people behave differently with regards to income risk as 
compared to that of health risk.   Thereby this study advises against the use of smoking as a 
proxy for pure financial domain based risk analyses and vice-versa.  The other finding of this 
essay is that both of the preferences – risk preference as well as time preference play role in 
occupational choice. 
Essay 2: Health State Dependence of Utility – Are there Gender Differences? An 
Application of Non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
  The second essay examines (Chater-3) whether health state dependence of utility 
varies over gender.  If yes, this can have important implications for spending, saving, and 
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portfolio allocation decisions, which can then affect wealth and welfare of household 
members over the remaining years of life. Contingent on the results of presence of gender 
difference, we also study what factors explain this difference by using non-linear Blinder-
Oaxaca (B-O) decomposition. This dissertation investigates the role of risk attitude in 
explaining the gender gap in utility.  For health states, this study not only uses seven objective 
health conditions separately, but also its composite measure. Other than that, this study also 
uses functional limitations as health measures. For utility proxy, it uses happiness as well as 
CES-D score from HRS data. 
Findings of Essay-2 
Gender heterogeneity in health dependence of utility does prevail not only when we 
use happiness as utility proxy but also when we use CES-D score; not only in seven objective 
health conditions but also in functional limitations. However, in functional limitations results 
are varying in some cases and more research is needed.  Non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca (B-O) 
decomposition unfolds that the risk attitudes along with marital status, log adjusted income, 
and age are the significant contributors to gender heterogeneity in utility.  This study affirms 
Hallidays‘ (2008) claims that though improvements in medical care lead to modest 
improvements in health, there may be larger potential gains to identifying as well as targeting 
factors that influence individual heterogeneity since the state dependence is mostly driven by 
individual characteristics.  
Essay 3: Health State Dependence of Utility – Racial and Ethnic Differences? 
  The third essay (Chater-4)  examines whether health state dependence of utility 
varies over race and ethnicity.  If yes, this can have important implications for spending, 
saving, and portfolio allocation decisions, which can then affect wealth and welfare of 
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household members over the remaining years of life. Contingent on the results of existence of 
racial-ethnic heterogeneity, this study thereby examines what factors explain this difference 
by using non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca (B-O) decomposition.  For health states this study not 
only uses seven objective health conditions separately, but also its composite measure – 
number of diseases. Other than that, this study also uses functional limitations as health 
measures. For utility proxy, it uses happiness as well as CES-D score. 
Findings of Essay-3 
Racial and ethnic heterogeneity in health dependence of utility does prevail not only 
when we use happiness as utility proxy but also when we use CES-D score; not only in seven 
objective health conditions but also in functional limitations. However, in functional 
limitations results are varying in some cases and more research is needed.  Non-linear 
Blinder-Oaxaca (B-O) decomposition unfolds that the risk attitudes along with marital status, 
log adjusted income, and age are the significant contributors to the racial-ethnic heterogeneity 
in utility.  This study affirms Hallidays‘ (2008) claims that though improvements in medical 
care leads to modest improvements in health, there may be larger potential gains to 
identifying as well as targeting factors that influence individual heterogeneity since the state 
dependence is mostly driven by individual characteristics.  
In the nutshell, this dissertation has the holistic approach towards the impact of risk 
attitude  in monetary front as well as health and happiness front. Its findings about behavioral 
inconsistency towards income and health risk as well as about racial-ethnic and gender 
heterogeneity in health dependence of utility are significant contributions for the future 
studies and for the policy makers.  
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Chapter-2: Risk Preference, Time Preference and Occupational Choice 
Abstract 
Given heterogeneous risk and time preferences of individuals, we investigate the 
impact of those preferences on sorting into occupations and industries using various measures 
of job risk.  We construct three  measures of risk across jobs, cross-categorized by occupation 
and industry: a fatal injury rate, non-fatal injury and illness rate, and a measure of inter-person 
income variability.  Using these measures, we analyze how risk and time preference of an 
individual affects his occupational choice.  We find that there are different domains of risk 
and that individuals do not think of these in the same way.  Using Health and Retirement 
Study data, we find behavioral inconsistency in health risks versus income risk.  Based on our 
results, we recommend against using health-based risk proxies (e.g., smoking behavior) for 
financial risk analyses and vice versa. 
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I. Introduction 
 This chapter investigates the impact of risk and time preference on individual 
occupation and industry choice.  This study cross classifies jobs by occupation and industry 
and construct three different measures of risk for each occupation-industry category.  We then 
use survey data that includes measures of risk tolerance and proxy measures of time 
preference, along with occupation and industry of the individual's current job, to examine 
individual selection into these occupation-industry categories.  Our primary question is, given 
the heterogeneity of risk across occupation-industry categories of jobs and the heterogeneity 
of risk tolerance across individuals, whether individuals sort into jobs in ways we would 
expect with respect to risk tolerance and time preference.   
 This question is not new, and we will shortly discuss some literature on the topic.  Our 
unique contributions in this chapter are the following: (1) We are able to examine riskiness of 
jobs and risk tolerance of individuals in two distinct domains of risk: health and injury risk 
and income risk.  We find strong evidence that the distinction is important.  (2) We construct 
riskiness measures of jobs for classification of jobs by both occupation and industry.  To our 
knowledge this has previously been done only for the fatality risk of jobs by Viscusi (2004) in 
his work on the value of a life.  We claim that the variation in other risks (health, income) 
across industries within occupation categories is potentially large and important.  (3) We are 
using survey data on a sample of workers who are near the end of their work-life.  By the end 
of the work-life, workers have arguably had more opportunity to attain their ideal choice in 
occupation and industry, as well as having had more opportunity to become informed about 
the risks.  Further, using this older sample allows us to treat educational attainment as pre-
10 
 
 
determined, rather than a decision that is taken jointly with the choice of occupation and 
industry.
2
  (4) Finally, we address whether controlling for time preference impacts the 
estimated effect of risk tolerance on the riskiness of the job category chosen. 
 We construct three measures of risk across jobs cross-categorized by occupation and 
industry: a fatal injury rate, non-fatal injury and illness rate, and a measure of income 
variability.  Using these measures, we analyze how risk and time preference of an individual 
affect his occupation-industry choice.  Given existing risk premiums in labor markets for risk 
in various occupations and industries, individuals with higher risk tolerance should sort into 
riskier jobs in order to capture those premiums. 
 Our three risk measures of jobs represent two different domains of risk: health and 
injury risk and income risk.  We also have survey data measures that allow us to separately 
examine attitudes about risk in these two separate domains.  We use questions specifically 
designed to elicit risk tolerance with respect to income, and use several proxy measures of 
risk attitudes regarding health (smoking behavior and other health related behaviors).  We 
examine these different domains and find evidence that individuals‘ preferences regarding 
these two domains are distinct.  Thus we caution against using measures of preference 
regarding one domain of risk to predict behavior regarding a different domain of risk. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section Two discusses previous 
literature.  Section Three presents our theoretical arguments and assumptions and hypotheses 
we will examine.  In Section Four we describe the data and methods used.  This includes both 
the data and methods used to construct our risk measures for jobs and the survey data and 
empirical model used for the main analysis, and how we construct our variables from that 
                                            
2
 We recognize there may be endogeneity regardless of the time order and will return to this point in our 
literature review and in our discussion of shortcomings and direction for further work. 
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data.  Section Five presents the empirical results from our analysis, including some robustness 
checks.  In Section Six we conclude and discuss directions for further work. 
 
II. Previous Literature and Background 
Here we discuss some relevant previous literature, both in economics and psychology, 
in order to provide some background for the present study.  Most of this literature falls into 
three categories: work focusing on heterogeneity in risk across jobs, those focusing on 
heterogeneity in risk and/or time preference across individuals, and those focused on 
measuring preferences. 
Weiss (1972) documents variations in incomes within a narrowly defined occupation -
- that of scientist -- and within age, education, and type of employment group among 
scientists.  He interprets this variation as income risk that individuals must consider when 
choosing an occupation.  King (1974) shows that income risk varies across occupations, and 
establishes that there is a wage premium associated with occupations with higher levels of 
income risk.  He also shows that individuals with higher parental wealth choose occupations 
with higher income risk.    
A different line of literature addresses how a subject‘s time preference affects 
occupational choice.  The story is a well-known one: individuals with high discount rates care 
a lot about present consumption and little about future values and will therefore be unwilling 
to make investments in human capital that require an up-front cost and pay a return in the 
future.  Therefore, those with high discount rates will choose occupations that require lower 
levels of human capital.  Munasinghe and Sicherman (2006) use smoking behavior as a proxy 
12 
 
 
for time preference.  They find lower entry wages and lower wage growth among smokers 
than among non-smokers in National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth data.   
Leigh (1986a) considers both risk and time preference in a recursive model of 
preference formation, human capital investment, and occupational choice.  His aim is to 
investigate the disproportionately high share of blacks in risky occupations.  He finds that risk 
and time preferences are not sufficient to explain the high prevalence of blacks in jobs with 
high health risks. 
Other authors find, in other contexts, that it is important to consider both risk and time 
preferences simultaneously.  Several recent studies (Andersen et al. 2008, Benjamin et al. 
2010, Tanaka et al. 2010) find that the estimates of time discount rates are significantly lower 
in the case of joint elicitation of risk and time preference than in the case where time 
discounting is estimated assuming risk neutrality.  In the present study, we take care to control 
for time preference in our estimates of the impact of risk preference on occupational choice. 
The occupational risk studies of which we are aware each focus on a single measure of 
occupational risk — either health and/or mortality risk (Leigh 1986a) or income risk (King 
1974, Evans and Weinstein 1982).  We want to think about both types of risks inherent in job 
choice, and address whether behavior of individuals is consistent with respect to these two 
different types of risk.  We will analyze three different measures of occupational risk and 
draw a comparison among them.   
We first construct those three risk measures — the fatal injury rate, non-fatal injury 
and illness rate,  and a measure of income variability for job categories cross-classified by 
occupation and industry — and then  examine how risk and time preferences (measured 
through survey questions on risk and time horizon of planning) relate to the riskiness of the 
13 
 
 
chosen occupation-industry category.  We test whether more risk-averse individuals select 
into less risky jobs, controlling for their time preference along with other demographic 
controls.   
Viscusi (2004) uses fatality rates within occupation-industry categories.  By cross-
classifying jobs, he captures a lot more variation in risk across jobs than is captured when 
classifying jobs by industry or occupation alone.  For example, a mid-level manager in the 
financial sector faces quite different risks than the same occupation in the mining industry. 
Similarly, an administrative assistant in the construction industry faces quite different risks 
than a steel worker in the same industry.  
Some previous literature posits that  risk and time preferences are determined by 
factors like race, family background (Leigh 1986a), income status of the family (Green et 
al.1996,  Viscusi 1978), and social identity (Benjamin et al.  2010) in the early years of one‘s 
life.  We will take preferences as given, but we will control for some of these additional 
factors in case they have additional effects on occupation other than through preference 
formation. 
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
Dolton, et al. (1989) estimates a simultaneous model of human capital investment and 
occupational choice, accounting for costs and benefits of various jobs, including non-
pecuniary factors, in this case "occupational status."  In our theoretical model, we think of risk 
associated with the job as a non-pecuniary factor.  
 We examine job choice on the basis of riskiness of the job of individuals observed 
relatively late in the work-life.  We assume that individual preferences are fixed over time.  
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This is a standard assumption in economics.  That risk and time preferences are fixed after 
adolescence is also supported empirically in both the psychology and economics literature 
(Gardner and Steinberg 2005, Albert and Steinberg 2011, Leigh 1986b).   
 We assume that equilibrium variations in market wages exist to compensate for both 
negative and positive non-pecuniary characteristics of jobs.  These include wage premia 
associated with risk, as well as both positive and negative variation in wages associated with 
other non-pecuniary job characteristics.  We assume that the risk wage premium is constant 
within an occupation-industry category over space and time, at least over the relatively short 
span of time reflected in our survey data responses.   
 We assume that older workers choose their current job given their educational 
attainment, which is pre-determined.  Agents choose a job in an occupation-industry category 
to maximize utility over the remaining lifetime: 
    



  
 dtlcueUE
T
tt
t
0
,max       (1) 
given the set of wages and job characteristics in the market, where ct represents time t 
consumption and lt  time t leisure in quality-adjusted units.  Leisure at each time point is a 
random draw from a known distribution for the occupation-industry category of the job.  Jobs 
with high health risks have a higher probability of a low draw for quality-adjusted leisure 
units.  Agents die at time T.  T is uncertain and is a random draw from a known distribution 
for individuals in the occupation-industry category.  Health and fatality risks of the job 
therefore affect lifetime utility negatively through lower expected values of T and lower 
expected quality of leisure.  However, the higher wages due to the risk premium positively 
affects lifetime utility through higher per-period consumption. 
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 We do not make assumptions about relative risk aversion (RRA) or absolute risk 
aversion in the form of the utility function, u(ct, lt).  Our empirical model is a reduced form 
model, and we will discuss the implications of the particular form of the utility function when 
we present the empirical model.  The time discount rate is represented by .  Choice of 
occupation-industry category may be affected both by risk preferences and time preferences.  
Holding risk tolerance constant, individuals with higher discount rates will place higher value 
on immediate (certain) per period consumption and less value on the risk of early death and 
the increased probability of reduced leisure quality in the future.  Thus, individuals with high 
discount rates may behave similarly to individuals with high risk tolerance. 
IV. Data 
Several data sources are used to construct variables required for the analysis.  We will 
first discuss the sources of data for, and the construction of, the three measures of risk across 
occupation-industry categories.  Then we will proceed to present information on the Health 
and Retirement Survey (HRS) data used for the analysis.   
IV.1 Job Riskiness Measures 
We use three different measures of riskiness of job categories, cross-classified by 
occupation and industry.  We use Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data for the non-fatal 
illness and injury incidence rate.  Our fatality incidence rates are calculated from those of 
Viscusi (2004).  For calculation of income variability, we use 5% U.S. Census data, acquired 
from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
16 
 
 
We use Viscusi‘s (2004) fatality incidence rates, which he constructed using BLS data 
on job-related fatalities over the period 1992-97.
3
.  For compatibility with HRS occupation 
and industry codes, we combined some of the industries and occupation categories.
4
    
Similarly, we calculate the rate for job-related non-fatal injuries and illnesses in each 
occupation-industry category using 2004 BLS data
5
 as follows:  
 NF Rate = (Number of Non-fatal Incidents / Employment) *100,000        
(2) 
Viscusi (2004) uses fatalities over the period 1992-1997 for calculating the fatalily 
rates. Because job-related fatalities are relatively rare events, using data over a shorter time 
period will result in a lot of zeroes in relatively low-risk job categories.  This is not a problem 
with non-fatal injuries.  Rates of non-fatal occupational injuries and illnesses are much more 
prevalent and include, for example, many cases of carpal tunnel syndrome among office 
workers, who would be extremely unlikely to die on the job. 
Wages and earnings are random variables containing an element of risk.  We use the 
standard deviation of logarithms (SDL)
6
 to capture the variability in income within 
occupation-industry cells using data from the 5% sample of the 2000 U.S. Census, which we 
obtained from  IPUMS.  The crosswalk available from IPUMS has been used to convert the 
                                            
3
 This time period differs from the one used for our non-fatal illness and injury rates.  We assume that the 
relative rates across occupation-industry cells is constant over time.  We have requested data from BLS and will 
re-calculate the fatality rates for a period that matches our other data more closely 
We have presently used relative employment in each category in 1997 in order to scale the rates for combining 
them.  Detailed information on the matching is available on request. 
5
The data used for non-fatal rates is available from the BLS website as ―TABLE R44.  Number of nonfatal 
occupational injuries and illnesses involving days away from work by occupation and industry sector, 2004‖.   
6
 SDL is logarithmic form of standard deviation and deviations are taken from logged geometric mean. 
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industry and occupation codes into the ones which are compatible with HRS data (1980 
Census codes).
7
  Self-employment has been classified as a separate occupation.   
The entire variation in income does not represent risk.  Variation in income within an 
occupation-industry category can be attributed to a number of factors, such as differences in 
experience, education, extent of self-employment in each occupation, regional earnings 
differences, and random, unexplained differences.  It is the random unexplained variation in 
earnings that generates the income risk within an occupation.  In order to capture that random 
variation, we first regress log wages  within each occupation-industry category on education, 
experience, experience squared, region and marital status using the 5% Census sample 
restricted to males aged 20-64.  We then use the residuals and constant from this regression, 
and take the SDL within each occupation-industry category to measure the income variability 
due to riskiness.  Note that we use a much broader age range here than the sample in our 
survey data used for the primary analysis.  King (1974) finds that mean and standard 
deviation ranking measures of income across occupations are stable across age cohorts.   
Table 1 shows the occupation-industry risk rates measured from the income variability 
using SDL.  The occupation of Professional Specialty Operations and Technical Support 
comes out to be least risky in the income domain across all the industries on the average, 
whereas self-employment comes out to be the most risky occupation across most of the 
industries. 
(Table 1 insert here) 
Table 2A shows the nonfatal injury and illness and Table 2B the fatal injury rates 
across occupation-industry cells.  Again the occupation of Professional specialty operations 
                                            
7
 Occupation Crosswalk -- OCC and OCCSOC 2000 Census Samples,  
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/volii/census_occtooccsoc.shtml 
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and technical support comes out to be least risky across all industries on the average.  Note 
that we do not have fatality and injury/illness data for self-employed persons, so we have 
excluded that occupation from both of these risk measures. 
(Table 2 insert here) 
 
IV.2 HRS Survey Data 
For the analyses we use data on individuals from the Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS).
 8
  This is a longitudinal survey started in 1992 that is representative for targeted birth 
cohorts, which we will discuss below.  The core survey is administered every other year, with 
some additional information collected by mail in some of the off-years. 
The primary information we need for our analysis is occupation and industry of the 
individual's current job and measures of risk and time preference.  HRS provides this and 
much more.  We are using males who have answered the risk preference questions and have 
provided the occupation and industry of their current job in at least one of the waves from 
1998 to 2004, inclusive.  We exclude the Assets and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) cohort, born 
1890-1923, due to their older age and therefore lower probability of reporting a current 
occupation as compared to the other HRS cohorts.  We include individuals from the original 
HRS cohort (born in 1931-41), the Children of the Depression Age (CODA) sample (born 
1924-30), the War Baby (WB) sample (born 1942-47), and the Early Baby Boomer (EBB) 
sample (born 1948-53).  The CODA and WB samples were added in 1998 and the EBB 
sample in 2004.   The CODA sample will have been sufficiently old that they are unlikely to 
be working by 1998, which is the first year of the data we are using.  Nevertheless, we will 
                                            
8
 HRS has a multi stage probability sample design with four distinct selection stages.  We use respondent level 
weights for most analyses in this paper.   
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include individuals who do report a job and meet our other criteria at that time.  Spouses and 
unmarried partners of individuals who were age-eligible were also included in the HRS, and 
we also include those individuals in our sample for analysis, regardless of age, if they meet 
our criteria for inclusion.   
We use data on both the reported occupation and industry of the respondent's current 
job and place that job into a category cross-categorized by occupation and industry.   
We exclude females from our analysis due to their lower rate of labor force 
participation, especially in the older cohorts in the HRS data.  The selection into the labor 
force is a complex issue that we do not wish to address in the current chapter.  Selection into 
the labor force may be correlated with risk and time preferences, and we would not be able to 
convincingly identify the effects on selection into the labor force separately from those on 
occupational choice.  Further, there may be barriers to entry into some occupations or 
industries for women in these cohorts that we cannot adequately control for. 
Though HRS data are longitudinal, we construct a cross-section analysis sample using 
data from 1998–2004.  We capture the last recorded risk preference, time preference, 
occupation, and industry for each individual during that period.  Prior to 1998, the risk 
preference questions were potentially tainted by status-quo bias.  The questions were changed 
beginning in 1998 to eliminate this concern, and were constant over the 1998-2004 period.  
We would ideally take all of the variables we need for our analysis from the 2004 survey.  
However, the risk preference questions were asked at the beginning of the panel (i.e., in 1992) 
and were then re-asked of a random subsample of respondents in later years.  New entrants to 
the survey were asked the risk preference questions when they joined the survey.  New 
20 
 
 
entrants can join the survey via a new marriage to an HRS respondent, or (primarily) as a 
member of added cohorts in 1998 and 2004. 
The set of questions designed to elicit risk preferences ask individuals to consider a 
series of choices about jobs.  They are told they must move due to allergies, and must choose 
between two jobs in the new location – one with a certain income equal to their current job 
and the other with a risky income.  With equal probability, the risky job will double the 
lifetime income or cut it by certain fraction.  Several subsequent questions are asked, varying 
the downside risk in order to narrow down the range of the risk aversion of the respondent.  
The exact wording of the questions and a table showing the various fractions given for the 
downside risk, along with the implied ranges of risk tolerance, are shown in Appendix A. 
Following the expected utility (EU) theory that an individual will accept a gamble 
only when the EU of the gamble exceeds the EU of the certain outcome, six relative risk 
aversion ranges can be constructed from the data.  We then collapse those six categories into 
three for our analysis – least risk averse, medium risk averse and most risk averse.9 
We want to examine behavior in response to both income risk and health risk.  If risk 
preference regarding these domains is different, then we should be careful to control for time 
preference regarding the two domains separately as well.  In constructing control variables to 
capture time preference, we divide time preference measures into two broad categories: 
financial and health.  The length of the financial planning horizon has been used as time 
preference indicator.  The wording of the HRS question about the financial planning horizon 
is shown in Appendix A. 
                                            
9
 Our results are qualitatively unaffected by instead using the six categories. 
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We use a health index as an indicator of time discounting in the health domain.  The 
health index includes the following questions: 
 Frequency of  moderate activity10  
 Whether the respondent had a prostrate exam since the previous wave 
We calculate a binary indicator equal to zero if the individual did not get a prostrate exam and 
never does moderate activity.  Otherwise the value is one. 
We estimate a linear model for each of the three risk measures.  We regress the risk 
measure of one‘s job on our measures of risk preference, time preference, and individual 
characteristics that may capture constraints in the opportunity set, such as age, race, 
education, family background variables and marital status.  We test the hypothesis that 
individuals with high risk aversion and lower time discount rates select into occupation-
industry categories with lower risk.  King (1974) found that those with higher family wealth 
in childhood choose occupations with higher income risk, and will test whether this also holds 
in our data.  
Family financial background represents the family‘s affluence level during 
respondent‘s childhood.  Another reason to include this variable is the following: We do not 
make any assumption about relative or absolute risk aversion in the utility function.  Some 
forms would imply independence of marginal risk taking  wealth or lifetime income, others 
would not.  Wealth and income are endogenously determined jointly with occupation but 
family financial background is a proxy measure that would be correlated with one‘s own 
wealth or lifetime income, but unaffected by own risk preference and occupational choice. 
                                            
10
 Survey question: "How often do you take part in sports or activities that are moderately energetic such as, 
gardening, cleaning the car, walking at a moderate pace, dancing, floor or stretching exercises: more than once a 
week, once a week, one to three times a month, or hardly ever or never? 
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 Kimball (2007) notes that survey-based risk preference measures are likely to be 
subject to measurement error which can cause attenuation bias.  However, the design of our 
analysis, in which we divide individuals into three relative levels of risk aversion, aims to 
minimize concern about this issue. If there is attenuation bias, it should affect all three groups 
and thus inferences about relative levels of risk aversion should be unaffected by attenuation 
bias.   
The dependent variables are log-transformed and survey weights have been used for 
the analysis. Table 3 presents the summary statistics. 
(Table 3 insert here) 
 
V. Results 
Results of our primary analysis are shown in Table 4.  In income variability risk, more 
risk aversion is associated with lower income variability of the job (column 1).  Those with 
medium and high risk aversion are in jobs with significantly less income variability than those 
with the lowest levels of risk aversion, and these effects are significant at the 1% level.  The 
coefficient for "most risk averse" is larger than that for the middle risk aversion group, but 
these two are not significantly different from one another.   
(Table 4 insert here) 
The time preference "effects" are interpreted as relative to the least forward looking, as 
the omitted category is those who indicated they are planning for "the next few months."  
Controlling for risk preference, those who are more forward looking (planning for the "next 
few years" or longer), tend to be in jobs with lower income risk than those who are more 
myopic, as we predicated.   
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Wealth in one's family of origin is also significant and with the expected sign.  Those 
with lower childhood family wealth are in jobs with lower risk than those with higher family 
wealth (the omitted group).  Thus, higher family wealth is associated with a willingness to 
take higher income risks.  If we have adequately measured risk preference, then this variable 
is operating through another mechanism.  It may proxy for higher financial resources, such as 
own wealth or family wealth.  Thus, this may indicate a willingness, given risk preference, to 
take more risk at the margin if you have greater resources.  Age is also positive and 
significant.  This may also indicate a willingness to take greater risks at the margin given that, 
the older one is, the more of lifetime income that is predetermined.   
It is also possible that the positive coefficient on age may result from constraints on 
the opportunity set due to discrimination in the labor market.  We also find that blacks, 
relative to whites, tend to be in jobs with riskier income, after controlling for other factors.  If 
we have adequately measured preferences, then this result may indicate occupational 
segregation in the labor market.  We do not see any significant differences across education 
groups. 
For non-fatal injury and illness risk (column 2), the middle risk aversion group is not 
significantly different from the least risk averse (omitted) group, but the most risk averse are 
in jobs with significantly higher health/injury risk (significant at 5%)  Recall that the survey 
questions we are using to measure risk preference relate to lifetime income.  We take these 
results as an indication that there are multiple domains of risk, and that individuals think 
about those different types of risk differently. 
In this estimate we again find that individuals with higher rates of time discounting 
tend to select into jobs with higher risk.  Those who are planning for the "next few years" or 
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"next 5 or 10 years" are in job categories with significantly lower health and injury risk than 
those who indicate they are planning only for the "next few months".  Given the very different 
measures used to measure riskiness of jobs in terms of income risk versus health risk, we 
cannot directly compare the coefficients across models, but the time preference results are 
qualitatively similar in the two estimates.   
Again, we find that blacks tend to be in jobs with higher risk than whites.  There is no 
significant difference by age here.  However, we do find significant differences across 
education groups that are consistent with the idea that those with high time discount rates are 
less willing to invest in human capital and trade risk for this investment.  Less than high 
school is the omitted education category.  Those with increasingly higher education have 
lower rates of health risk in their jobs.   
We also find that those who were previously married (to include both divorced and 
widowed, but not currently married) are in riskier jobs than their married counterparts (the 
omitted group).  There are various stories one might tell about this result and we will leave 
interpretation to the reader.   
In Column 3, we show results from estimating the job-related fatality rate of the 
current job.  We do not find risk aversion to be a significant predictor of this type of risk of 
the job.  In fact, the only thing that is significant in this estimate is education.  These results 
are very similar to those for non-fatal health risk of the job – those with more education are in 
jobs with lower fatality rates. 
(Table 5 insert here) 
In Table 5 Column 1, we re-estimate the income variability model using a more 
complete set of occupation-industry categories than for which we have the risk measures for 
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the health and fatality risk.  This allows us, for example, to include self-employment as an 
occupation, and to include the agriculture industry, which were omitted from the estimates in 
Table 4 for comparability across the models.  We get very similar estimates to those in Table 
4, except that we now find that those with graduate education have higher levels of lower 
income risk than those with less than a high school education. 
Recall that we previously mentioned literature that finds that controlling for risk 
aversion is important in studies estimating the time discount rate (Andersen et al. 2008, 
Benjamin et al. 2010, Tanaka et al. 2010).  We thus consider the possibility that estimates of 
the effect of risk preference on some choice variable might also differ based on whether one 
controls for time preference.  We do find significant relationships between job risk and time 
preference.  Therefore, to check whether our risk preference estimates would differ if we were 
unable to control for time preference, we re-estimate the income variability model without the 
time preference measure.  This is shown in Table 5 Column 2.  It appears that some of the 
variation in time preference then gets picked up by education, in that the college group is now 
significantly different from the less than high school group – the former's job has less income 
variability compared to the latter.  However, other coefficients and significant levels remain 
remarkably stable. 
Our results indicate inconsistency in behavior regarding different measures of job risk 
– people react differently to income risk than to health risk.  As robustness check, we also 
estimate the models from Table 4 Columns 1 and 2 using smoking behavior as a proxy for 
risk aversion, in place of our income-based risk preference measures.  We also substitute a 
different measure of time preference here based on two measures of preventive behavior 
related to health.  These results are shown in Table 6.  We find that non-smokers, whom we 
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assume to be more risk averse, are in jobs with significantly higher income risk, but that the 
health risk of the jobs is not significantly different between the two groups.  We also find that 
the health index is not significantly related to riskiness of the job by either risk measure.  
However, again we see that education appears to be more significantly related to riskiness of 
the job, in both estimates, than was the case previously when we controlled for time 
preference using the time horizon of planning measure, which is more financial in nature than 
the health measure we use here.  Further investigation is needed here, but our point that 
people think about health risk differently than income risk seems supported by these 
estimates.  
(Table 6 insert here) 
We do one further robustness check, which is to  check whether we would get 
different results if we did not use survey weights in our estimates, but instead clustered the 
standard errors.  Clustered standard errors address the potential problem due to our 
independent variables having clustered values since we have far fewer occupation-industry 
categories than individuals in our data.  Therefore our independent variable does not have any 
variation among the individuals in the same occupation- industry cell.  The results, reported in 
Appendix Table B1, are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4, except that education is 
much more strongly related to both health and fatality risk of the job than we found when 
using survey weights.. 
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VI . Conclusion and Discussion  
We find a behavioral inconsistency for different domains of risk.  We find that more 
risk averse people do get selected into jobs with less risk if we use both a job riskiness 
measure and a risk preference measure based on income risk.  However, health risk seems to 
be different from income risk.  We might think that we can translate health risks into income 
equivalents, but it does not appear that individuals think of health risk in that way.  Another 
way in which we see this difference between the two domains of risk is that those with higher 
childhood family wealth take higher income risks in their job choice, but take lower health 
risks.   
We believe this distinction between different domains of risk has wider potential 
application than  just job choice.  We advise care in thinking about what kinds of risk 
preference measures researchers use to predict which kinds of risk taking behavior.   
Important other contributions of our study include using both occupation and industry 
to classify jobs, as suggested by Viscusi (2004).  We have also contributed newly calculated 
risk measures, both for health and injury risk across jobs by occupation-industry categories, 
and income variability across those job categories.  We would encourage use of these 
measures by other researchers, and will be happy to provide calculation details or Stata code 
to anyone wishing to repeat the exercise, say for a different time period.   
This study is also relevant for individuals in making their choices about jobs.  The 
information we have provided in Tables 1 and 2 may be of use to them in evaluating job 
riskiness in a given industry-occupation cell. 
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Further work is needed to clarify which types of measures best capture risk preference 
regarding health.  Our proxy measure based on smoking behavior is quite crude and may also 
be thought of as a proxy for time preference, for which it has been used in prior work 
(Munasinghe andSicherman 2006). 
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Chapter – 3 Health State Dependence of Utility – Are there Gender Differences? An 
Application of Non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
Abstract: 
This study examines Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data in order to ascertain 
whether there is a gender difference in the  marginal utility over different  health states and 
contingent upon the findings of health state dependence of utility I further investigate the 
factors contributing to the gender difference in utility.  I begin with theoretical and empirical 
models used by Finkelstein, et al. (2010) relaxing the assumptions of those models to allow 
for differential effects by gender.  I estimate fixed-effects ordinary least square as well as 
logistic models using nationally representative longitudinal data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS).  Consistent with prior literature, we run our models with the sample 
which is above age 50 and not in labor force and has medical insurance.  This study examines 
various measures of health - objective reports of seven health conditions, ADLs and IADLs.  
We use subjective well-being and Center of Epidemiology Studies –Depression Scale (CES-
D) score to measure utility from nine waves of HRS data (1992 – 2008).  The nonlinear 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition was used to identify the contribution of each predisposing 
(age, race, ethnicity, risk attitude, region) and need factors (self perception of health and 
physician‘s judgment about health) in explaining the gender differences in utility and to 
estimate the residual unexplained disparity.  Coefficients of health indicators, income, risk 
attitude, marital status and ethnicity turn out to be significant in explaining utility gap among 
men and women. 
 Using happiness as a utility proxy and objective health measures in our baseline 
model, we find that health dependence is mostly negative in both men and women except 
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when we use ADLs as a health indicator in which case it is positive for men. This might be 
due to higher self-reporting of diseases by women. However, more research is needed before 
we can make any conclusion here.   
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Introduction: 
The Epidemiology literature has several empirical evidences (Grant, Hicks, Taylor et 
al. 2009; Levy 2005; Nohria, Vaccarino and Krumholz 1998; Chin and Goldman 1998)  that 
diseases impact the two genders differently due to biological and social construction. 
Contingent upon the findings of Epidemiology literature, the study of gender differences is 
becoming important, not only in the occurrence of health conditions, but also in the impact, 
treatments and outcomes of diseases.  There exists gender difference not only in the impact of 
disease but also in the quality of life after disease, efficacy of medications for the treatment of 
diseases, comorbidity of various diseases, as well as mortality rate of various chronic 
diseases. In the presence of gender differences in the above mentioned areas, the relation 
between health status and utility might also vary over gender. This calls for a new research 
area of heterogeneity in health state dependence of utility.  Recent Economics literature 
(Halliday 2008) also supports that state dependence is driven by individual characteristics, 
and there are larger potential gains to identifying as well as targeting factors that influence 
individual heterogeneity rather than just focusing on improvement of health status. 
The objectives of this study are: (1) to examine gender heterogeneity  in health state 
dependence of utility,  and (2) contingent upon results of the first objective, to identify the 
contribution of observed factors behind gender difference in health state dependence of utility 
using the nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.
11
  
                                            
11 We used Stata-11 for non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Its non-linear version was included 
in Stata on 08/25/2011 which allows us to do the decomposition with logit . 
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This study uses Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data in order to ascertain whether 
there exists a gender gap in variation of marginal utility over the health states.  We use both 
the objective (objective reports of seven health conditions) and the subjective measures of 
health.  However, in the literature, women have been found to report more on the subjective 
health measures (ADLs and IADLs) as compared to men. More self-reporting of diseases by 
females  might bias our results if we use the self-reported health measures. Therefore, we also 
use seven objective health measures. However, this study provides an opportunity to draw a 
comparison between the results of objective and subjective health measures.   The health state 
dependence of utility might also be different for women because of difference in labor market 
participation, wage gap, and occupational segregation over gender which will thereby impact 
the health state dependence of consumption.  Therefore, following the literature, our study 
uses a sample which is out of labor force and has health insurance. This is a critical issue 
since if we use  the sample which is still in the labor force, it might bias our results even more 
because of the existence of gender wage gap , though we agree that we cannot get rid of this 
bias completely since gender wage-gap leads to gender wealth-gap also. By using a sample 
which is out of labor force, we can  reduce the severity of bias but we cannot get rid of it 
completely.  This study uses happiness as a proxy of utility.  As an alternative, we also use 
Center of Epidemiology Studies – Depression Scale (CES-D) score in place of happiness. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section Two discusses previous 
literature.  Section Three presents our theoretical arguments and assumptions and hypotheses 
we will examine.  In Section Four we describe the data, methods and empirical model used 
for the main analysis, and how we construct our variables from that data.  Section Five 
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presents the empirical results from our analysis, including some robustness checks.  In Section 
Six we conclude and discuss directions for further work. 
 
II. Previous Literature and Background 
We divide the literature for this study into two categories: (1) utility and health 
literature; and (2) gender difference literature. 
In utility and health literature, seminary work has been done by Richard J. Zeckhauser 
(1970, 1973), Kenneth J. Arrow (1974), Viscusi and Evans (1990, 1991a, 1991b) followed by 
Halliday (2008) and Finkelstein et al. (2009, 2011).   In early 1970s Richard J. Zeckhauser 
(1970, 1973), Kenneth J. Arrow (1974) had developed the models of health care in which 
utility functions in the good and the poor health states assumed quite different shapes.  Later 
in the 1990s Viscusi and Evans (1990) using the chemical worker survey (1982)
12
 ascertain 
the findings of  Zeckhauser and Arrow.  Viscusi and Evans find that the marginal utility of 
income depends on the health state.  They elicit the fallacy of monetary equivalence for a job 
injury. The logic behind monetary equivalence is that death means fall in income, and thereby 
an  increase in marginal utility of income, however an injury not leading to death has a 
different impact.  Their study finds that MU of income/money falls with the onset of job 
illness/injury.  They find that  less than full insurance is one of the  most appropriate and 
significant implications of decline in marginal utility of income/wealth in ill health state. 
Halliday (2008) studies the  heterogeneity in health state dependence using Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from 1984-1997 on self reported health status.  For 
                                            
12
  1982 Chemical worker survey is the subsample of workers analyzed in Section III. of Viscusi and O‘Connor 
(1984) 
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half of the population he finds modest degree of state dependence whereas for the other half 
he finds degree of health state dependence to be near one but their health status mostly does 
not change over the life span. Author holds that though improvements in medical care leads to 
modest improvements in health, there may be larger potential gains to identifying as well as 
targeting factors that influence individual heterogeneity since the state dependence is mostly 
driven by individual characteristics.  
Finkelstein et al. (2009) discuss various approaches/methods of measuring health 
dependence of marginal utility of consumption.  Finkelstein et al. (2011) find that marginal 
utility of consumption depends on health states.  Using empirical analysis based on Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS) data they find 10 to 25 % decline in the marginal utility of 
consumption due to one standard deviation increase in chronic health condition.  This has 
impact on optimal health insurance levels and life cycle savings.   
The second category of literature (which is more of a medical field literature) deals 
with gender differences in the impact of various diseases, in the quality of life after disease, 
efficacy of medications for treatment of the disease, comorbidity of various diseases, as 
well as mortality rate of various chronic diseases.  The following studies provide the 
evidence of gender differences in health conditions, treatment,  impact, mortality, and 
longevity  which further substantiates our argument regarding the need to study 
heterogeneity in health state dependence.  
Grant, Hicks, Taylor et al (2009) using the data  from a sub-population with diabetes 
from 4060 adults aged18 years and over living in South Australia found that men and women 
face different challenges in the management of diabetes. They also found that the effect of 
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body weight, chronic stressors, psychological resources and life events was stronger in 
women as compared to men. 
Chin and Goldman (1998), using a dataset on 435 patients admitted nonelectively in 
an urban university hospital during 1993-1994 find that there exists a  gender differences in 
one year survival and self-reported quality of life (health related) among the patients 
admitted with heart failure even after adjusting for clinical and socioeconomic variables. 
They also find that women had less improvement in physical health status and perceived 
their quality of care to be lower. 
Nohria, Vaccarino and Krumholz (1998) in their study on myocardial infarction 
using the medline database from 1966 to 1997 find that women fare worse as compared to 
men.  Women sustaining a myocardial infarction have a higher crude, short-term mortality 
rates than men in their study.  Other than age the authors identified several other factors 
like an increased incidence of cardiac risk factors, decreased efficacy of therapeutic 
modalities (thrombolytics and aspirin), and a tendency toward the underuse of these 
treatments in women relative to men, that might also contribute toward the worse prognosis 
of women.  
In the field of health and aging research it is well known by now that women outlive 
men on an average (Jennifer Ward-Batts, 2001; Case and Deaton, 2002).  Women also 
differ in self-reporting of their health than men. There are evidences that women report 
lower subjective well-being as well as lower health-related quality of life (HRQOL) than 
men (Chin and Goldman 1998).   
Gender difference also exists in mortality in coronary artery bypass surgery 
(Hannan et al. 1992). Gender  comes out to be a significant predictor of mortality in the 
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study done by Hannan et al. in 1992 using  a state-wide data base containing clinical risk 
factors for cardiac surgery.  The crude mortality rates for coronary artery bypass surgery for 
men was 3.08% and for women were 5.43% in New York State in 1989.  Risk-adjusted 
(indirectly standardized) mortality rates were 3.33% and 4.45% for men and women, 
respectively. The risk-adjusted odds ratio of women to men experiencing in-hospital death 
was 1.52.    
 There are gender differences in comorbidity as well as psychological comorbidity 
(Levy 2005,  Hesselbrock, Mayer, Keener 1985).  Levy (2005) examines gender differences 
in attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptom comorbidity with oppositional 
defiant disorder, conduct disorder, separation anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, 
speech therapy, and remedial reading in children.  Study finds that internalizing disorders are 
more common in females. 
Verbrugge (1989) finds gender differences in HRQOL.  Verbrugge (1989) points 
out some theoretical explanations for women's reduced HRQOL which  includes hormonal 
differences, lifestyle differences, variations in perception of illness, variation in the ways 
men and women convey symptoms, and differences in the care each sex receives for 
illness. He finds that though women outlive men however, they report lower subjective 
well-being as well as lower health-related quality of life (HRQOL) than men (Chin and 
Goldman 1998).   
Intuition behind our study: 
Combining the two categories of literature, this study tests the hypothesis that there 
are gender differences in the health state dependence of marginal utility.  Our intuition is that 
the relation between health state and utility varies over gender. However, the  health state 
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dependence of utility might also be different for females because of difference in labor force 
participation, wage gap, and occupational segregation over gender, which will inturn impact 
the health state dependence of consumption. Following the literature, to avoid the impact of 
gender gap in labor market, we include only those subjects who are retired from the labor 
market. 
III. Theoretical Framework 
Basic theoretical framework is based on Goddeeris state dependence model and 
Finkelstein‘s model of health state dependence of marginal utility which has been revised to 
allow for difference by gender. 
Life time Utility is the sum of: 
1. Current period non-health consumption 
2. Current period health consumption 
3. Expected utility from next period consumption 
 
 
Where Ø = Coefficient of level of sickness 
δ = Discount rate 
θ = Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
γ = Coefficient of relative risk aversion 
S = Level of sickness 
C= non-health consumption 
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H = Out of pocket Health Consumption 
Assumptions: 
1. We assume health status/degree of sickness to be in continuum. 
2. We adopt Epstein-Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) formulation of preferences to allow 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and relative risk aversion to vary independently. 
3. Wealth in the sick state is pre-determined i.e. health shocks do not change wealth. Therefore, 
in empirical analysis we include only those individuals who are no longer in labor market to 
exclude the first order effect of health shock on income. 
4. Impact of labor market gender gap is minimal (in empirical analysis we include only those 
individuals who are no longer in labor market).  However, it could have an impact through 
wealth variable.  We can only minimize the bias by taking HH wealth variable but cannot get 
rid of it completely. 
5. Both healthy and  sick individuals derive utility from health expenditure. Healthy individuals 
derive utility from precautionary health expenditure. 
6. All have health insurance which finances fraction b of health expenditure. It is financed by tax 
rate on permanent income.  
Simplified Two Period Model: 
Suppose an individual lives only two periods. 
Period-1 utility is given by: 
 
Period-2 utility is given by: 
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Subject to inter temporal budget constraint: 
                                  
Where  τ is the tax rate on permanent income ,  
r is the real interest rate. 
                                
W is the second period wealth. 
Therefore, 
             
Solving the model backwards:          
 
Subject to : 
W =                                                                                            (8)                                                  
Therefore, the optimal non-health consumption expenditure and health consumption 
expenditure in second period will be: 
                                               
                                                                       (10)                                             
By plugging  and  back in the second period utility we will calculate period-2 utility 
for all sickness levels, starting from 0 to the highest level of sickness prevailing in the 
population. Thus, now the second period utility will be a function of second period wealth 
corresponding to all sickness levels. 
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                                                                             (12)             
To calculate expected second period utility, we will take weighted average of second 
period utilities corresponding to all sickness levels, with weights being equal to probability 
‗p‘ of sickness level zero and ‗1- p‘ for all other non-zero sickness levels combined.(We are 
assuming additive utility). Then, we calculate  from life time utility function and inter-
temporal budget constraint in terms of Y and  
 
Parameters in terms of proportionality of Income: 
 
 
We can rewrite this as: 
                                                                                                             (14) 
                                                                                                             
                 
Now we use inter-temporal budget constraint to express expected second period utility as 
a function of first period consumption. 
Inter-temporal budget constraint is: 
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Substituting this into first period utility:  
                                                                                                                                  
By taking derivative of w.r.t .  and respectively and equating them to zero, we can 
express  and in terms of Y such that: 
                                                                                                      
                                                                                                      
Hence, 
                                                                                                        
Where                                          
Deriving Indirect Utility Functions: 
We can derive indirect utility function  by substituting into second period 
utility equations. 
Indirect Utility function for S=0: 
                                                                         
Indirect Utility function for S being non-zero: 
          
Based on these indirect utility functions, the non-linear regression form will be: 
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Where is the income gradient of utility in different non-zero sickness levels relative to 
zero sickness level ( . Therefore, 
                 
                                                                                                    
                                                                                                    
By dividing equation (26) by (28) and by plugging in the value derived from dividing 
equation (9) by equation (10) we can calculate  the parameter of health dependent marginal 
utility of consumption ( ).   
                                                                        
 
Thus, the ratio between  and gives us state dependence. Thus, the estimate of   
provides us direct test of sign of state dependence. If  is negative, it implies marginal 
utility (in case of happiness as a proxy of utility) declines as the health deteriorates and vice 
versa if we are using CES-D as a proxy of utility. Magnitude of state dependence is measured 
by   which depends on the ratio of estimated coefficients of   and .  Since the 
denominator of equation – (29) is weakly greater than the one if there is no full-insurance, 
therefore the true magnitude of state dependence will be smaller than the  ratio of estimated 
coefficients of   and . 
Non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition: 
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Subsequent to the findings of our first hypothesis where we test whether health 
dependence of marginal utility varies over gender (and we find the strong evidence of 
existence of gender variation), the next objective is to tease out which variable causes gender 
gap in health dependence of utility, if any.  We use non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca (B-O) 
decomposition.  The B-O decomposition teases out the outcome variables between two groups 
– (1) a part that is explained by differences in observed characteristics, and (2). that part 
which is attributable to the difference in coefficients of these characteristics in the regression 
equation (in other words, difference in returns to these characteristics). Oaxaca-Blinder linear 
decomposition has been widely used in labor literature but if the outcome variable is non-
linear, the standard Oaxaca-Blinder linear decomposition is not applicable.  Fairlie (1999, 
2003)  developed decomposition method for binary dependent variables. Recently  work has 
been done on non-linear decomposition by Sinning, Hahn and Bauer (2008). We apply non-
linear B-O decomposition by first estimating the logistic regressions separately for males and 
females (see equations 30 and 31) and then decomposing the difference between the two into 
explained and unexplained components. 
 
 
Where the subscript f refers to females and m refers to males. 
The difference between equations (30) and (31) is decomposed by rewriting the 
conventional decomposition equation in conditional expectation form: 
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IV.  Data 
For the analyses we use data on individuals from the Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS).
 
 This is a longitudinal survey started in 1992 that is representative for targeted birth 
cohorts, which we will discuss below.  The core survey is administered every other year, with 
some additional information collected by mail in some of the off-years. 
The primary information we need for our analysis is household income, household 
wealth, occurrence of health shock, out of pocket medical expenditure, and demographics.  
HRS provides this and much more.  We are using all the nine waves (1992 - 2008) of HRS 
data from RAND HRS and Tracker files for our main analysis.  We use a sample with age 
50+, who have health insurance and  who are either retired or not working (in order to avoid 
the impact of  gender gap in labor market on one hand and the impact of labor market  income 
on consumption on the other hand). We include individuals from the original HRS cohort 
(born in 1931-41), the Children of the Depression Age (CODA) sample (born 1924-30), the 
War Baby (WB) sample (born 1942-47), and the Early Baby Boomer (EBB) sample (born 
1948-53).  The CODA and WB samples were added in 1998 and the EBB sample in 2004.   
The CODA sample will have been sufficiently old that they are unlikely to be working by 
1998, which is the first year of the data we are using logged transformation of HH income 
(Average of HH income over all waves)  + 5% current HH wealth adjusted for HH 
composition (divided by 1.7 if coupled and by 1 if single).  
    Corresponding with the literature, we do the analyses for seven diseases 
hypertension, stroke, arthritis, cancer, diabetes, chronic lung disease, and  heart disease as 
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well as the composite measure of number of diseases.  For robustness check, we repeat the 
analyses using Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and IADLs from wave 2 onwards (1994—
2008)
13
.  Details on cross-wave difference of ADL and IADL questions can be found in 
appendix – 3A.    
For utility measures we use Subjective well-being (SWB) measures‘ questions on 
happiness.  As an alternative, we use CES-D score which is the sum of feelings like 
depression, sadness, loneliness etc. Details can be found in Appendix-3A.  Higher the score, 
more negative the respondent's feelings are in the past week. 
Permanent Income is average of HH income (adjusted for HH composition)
14
 across 
waves 1992 to 2008. We have taken annual HH Income adjusted for HH composition. We 
also add 5% of current HH wealth (excluding housing and automobile) to it. Permanent 
Income  includes wages and salary, business income, dividend, interest income, other asset 
income, pension, government transfers, other sources.  Details on construction of permanent 
income measure can be found in appendix – B.  Household  Wealth includes: Net values of 
stock, MF, investment trusts , checking A/c, Saving A/c, Money markets, CD, T-bill, other 
savings and assets minus non-housing and non - automobile debts. Average HH wealth is 
average of wealth over all waves whenever HH enters.  Details on construction of wealth 
measure can be found in appendix – 3B.  
 
                                            
13
 We exclude wave – 1 for ADL and iADL based analyses because of inconsistency in the way questions were 
asked in wave – 1 in the survey. 
14
 We use OECD adjustment for HH size: Divide total HH income by 1.7 if respondent  is married and living 
with spouse in same HH in that wave and divide by 1 if single. 
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V. Results 
We regress subjective happiness (proxy of utility) on health/sickness level, permanent 
income and interaction term of health/sickness level and permanent income. 
Our sample has 26,300 (person years) observations for women (See Table 3.1 for 
summary statistics) and 25,100 for men (age over 50, not in labor market and have health 
insurance). We use probability weights for the analyses. The data is tested for 
heteroskedasticity (using ado file xttest3).  Since heteroskedasticity was present, we use 
robust standard errors to correct it.  We do not care about serial correlation since it is a 
micropanel (only 9 waves) and serial correlation is a problem only for long panels (over 20 
years). Sample was tested for multicollinearity by using stata user written Collin command.  
We include wave fixed effects in our regression since we failed to reject the null of time 
dummies not jointly significant using testparm command. 
Equation (24) is empirically calculated by the running the following fixed effects regression: 
)                                                           (33)                                                    
The effect of permanent income on utility gets absorbed by individual fixed effects 
( ), in order to capture that, we run the auxiliary regression of the following type to get the 
coefficient of permanent income: 
                                                                                        (34)                                                                                    
In our baseline model (Table-3.2), we regress utility proxy on the variable ‗number of 
diseases‘ which is the sum of seven health conditions (hypertension, stroke, arthritis, cancer, 
diabetes, chronic lung disease, and  heart disease), interaction between permanent income and 
number of diseases along with other control variables (age, wave fixed effects, individual 
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fixed effects).  The estimates of individual fixed effects derived from this regression are 
regressed on race, ethnicity, dummy for gender, permanent income (adjusted for HH 
composition). To estimate the parameter of state dependence, the coefficient of interaction 
term of diseases and log permanent income are divided by the coefficient of permanent 
income (adjusted for HH composition).  Analyses of all the diseases separately(Table-3.3) 
also shows that health dependence of utility varies over gender.  For stroke, lung  and cancer 
the health state dependence is negative for males whereas positive for females. 
However, when we use  ADL and IADL as measures of health, we got contradictory 
results.   Coefficient of state dependence of utility among females is higher negative (as 
compared to men) in the case of instrumental health (Table3.6 and 3.7).  In subjective report 
of diseases (ADLs as well as ADL wide) females have been found to have negative state 
dependence (Table3.4 and 3.5) whereas state dependence is positive for men.  
One possible explanation is that the females do more of the instrumental activities in 
households like preparing meals, attending phone calls etc. which might lead to women 
reporting more on IADLS and biasing our results for state -- dependence. However, mean of  
ADLs is also higher among females.   
Now, since the results tell us that there is gender heterogeneity in health dependence 
of utility,  it is important for us to identify the contribution of observed factors behind gender 
gap in utility. We use the nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for the same. The 
geometric means of utility proxy (Happiness) is 2.44 for men and 2.37 for women which 
amounts to a difference of 2.8 percent.  Adjusting women‘s endowment levels to that of men 
would increase women‘s utility by 2.2%.  Approximately 79 percent of the utility gap is 
explained by the endowment effect.  A gap of 0.6% remains unexplained. The significant 
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contributors towards the explained gap are marital status, number of diseases,  log adjusted 
income, risk attitudes and ethnicity.  
Taking CES-D score as utility proxy,  we find that the means of CES-D is 1.37 for 
men and 1.76 for women yielding a score gap of 0.39.  Adjusting women‘s endowment levels 
to that of men would lead to mean decline of 0.21 in CES-D score. Thus, 54 percent of the 
score gap is explained by endowment levels.  
Robustness Checks: 
Robustness checks have been done using alternative specification logit and by using 
CES-D as an alternative utility proxy.  However, a piece of caution is that we lose lot of 
information in panel data fixed effect logit since the fixed-effects models are looking at the 
determinants of within-subject variability. If there is no variability within a subject, there will 
be nothing left to examine. In other words, if happiness status is something that hardly ever 
changed across time, there wouldn‘t be many cases left for a fixed effects logit analysis. Other 
techniques, like xtreg, fe, do not cost us so many cases (Paul D. Allison 2009).  
The results with logit stand our baseline model results for most of the diseases.  
Results with CES-D score as a disutility proxy (opposite to happiness) also stand our baseline 
results that health dependence of utility varies over gender. Results of regressions of CES-D 
on alternative health measures like ADLs, IADLs and number of diseases have been reported 
in appendix-3C. 
 
VI. Conclusion and Discussion 
 We find gender differences in health state dependence of utility.  Using 
happiness as a utility proxy and seven objective health measures in our baseline model, we 
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find that for stroke, lung  and cancer the health state dependence is negative for males 
whereas positive for females.  Coefficient of state dependence of utility among females is 
higher negative (as compared to men) in the case of instrumental health.  In subjective report 
of diseases (ADLs as well as ADL wide) females have been found to have negative state 
dependence.  
One of the  possible explanations is behavioral gender difference.  Females self-report 
the diseases to be worse as compared to men.  The other possible explanation is gender 
difference in preferences.  Females who are comparatively more risk averse, care about their 
health more and self report the functional limitations more. Another possible explanation is 
that the females do more of the instrumental activities in households like preparing meals, 
attending phone calls etc. which might lead to women reporting more on IADLS and biasing 
our results for state dependence. Mean of  ADLs is also higher among women in our dataset 
also.  Since, health state dependence is being measured as a ratio between the interaction term 
of  self-reported health × permanent income and permanent income, the higher self-report of 
diseases bias the results for  health state dependence.   
The non-linear B-O decomposition of utility unfolds that the significant contributors 
towards the explained gender gap in  utility  are marital status, number of diseases,  log 
adjusted income, risk attitudes and ethnicity. The geometric means of utility proxy 
(Happiness) is 2.44 for men and 2.37 for women (Mean of happiness is 0.865 for women and 
0.892 for men) which amounts to a difference of 2.8 percent.  Adjusting women‘s endowment 
levels to that of men would increase women‘s utility by 2.2%.  Approximately 79 percent of 
the utility gap is explained by the endowment effect.   
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This study affirms Hallidays‘ (2008) claims that though improvements in medical care 
leads to modest improvements in health, there may be larger potential gains to identifying as 
well as targeting factors that influence individual heterogeneity since the state dependence is 
mostly driven by individual characteristics.  
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Chapter – 4 Health State Dependence of Utility – Racial and Ethnic Differences? 
Abstract: 
This study re-examines Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data in order to ascertain 
whether there is heterogeneity in the health dependence of marginal utility over race and 
ethnicity.  This study begins with theoretical and empirical models used by Finkelstein, et al. 
(2010) relaxing the assumptions of those models to allow for differential effects by race, and 
ethnicity.  I estimate fixed-effects models using the sample which is above age 50 and not in 
labor force and has medical insurance.  I use objective reports of seven health conditions 
(hypertension, stroke, arthritis, cancer, diabetes, chronic lung disease, and heart disease).  I 
use subjective well-being and a composite well-being measure (mental health index) 
developed by Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression scale (CES-D) (which is the ‗sum 
of six negative indicators‘ minus ‗two positive indicators‘) as a proxy measure of utility. The 
nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition was used to identify the contribution of each 
predisposing (age, gender, risk attitude, region) and need factors (self perception of health and 
physician‘s judgment about health) in explaining the race and ethnicity differences in utility 
and to estimate the residual unexplained difference.  Coefficients of health indicators, income, 
risk attitude, marital status and age turn out to be significant in explaining utility gap among 
race and ethnicities. 
 Using happiness as a utility proxy and objective health measures in our baseline 
model, I  find heterogeneity of health state dependence of utility among hispanic and non-
hispanic and whites, and black in the case of all the seven diseases. Since, there is 
heterogeneity in the health dependence of utility, the policies like Medicare, Medicaid and 
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Social Security would have varying impact on people depending upon race, and ethnicity. 
This study has important implications for portfolio allocation, spending, saving, bequests, 
welfare of elderly women and men of varying race and ethnicities, and Social Security and 
Medicare policy. 
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Introduction: 
 
Health differences as well as health disparity over race and ethnicity are amongst the 
major concerns in the U.S. health care nowadays especially after Institute of Medicine 
report
15
.  A disparity connotes an unfair difference across racial/ethnic groups. For instance, 
an unfair difference in health care utilization, quality of care, or access to care is a disparity.  
The epidemiology literature shows that different diseases impact different races, and 
ethnicities differently.  The differences exist not only in the impact of disease but also in the 
quality of life after disease, efficacy of medications for treatment of the disease, comorbidity 
of various diseases, as well as mortality rate of various chronic diseases.  In the presence of 
the above mentioned differences, the relationship between health state and utility might also 
vary over race, and ethnicity.  This study aims at testing the hypothesis of presence of 
heterogeneity in the health state dependence of utility.  I use Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) data in order to ascertain whether there is a race, and ethnicity difference in the 
variation of marginal utility of consumption over different health states.  I  use both objective 
and subjective measures of health.   
Moreover, my  study  also provides an opportunity to draw a comparison between the 
results of objective and subjective health measures. This study uses happiness as a proxy of 
utility.  As an alternative I also use Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression scale (CES-
D) in place of happiness.  CES-D is a composite well-being measure (mental health index) 
which is the ‗sum of six negative indicators‘ minus ‗two positive indicators‘.  The negative 
                                            
15 “Disparities in the health care delivered to racial and ethnic minorities are real and are associated 
with worse outcomes in many cases, which is unacceptable.‖ 
  -- Alan Nelson, chair of the committee that wrote the Institute of Medicine report, Unequal Treatment: 
Confronting Racial and Disparities in Health Care.   
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indicators measure whether the respondent experienced the following six sentiments all or 
most of the time: depression, everything is an effort, sleep is restless, felt alone, felt sad, and 
could not get going. The positive indicators measure whether the respondent felt happy and 
enjoyed life, all or most of the time.   
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section Two presents the intuition 
and purpose behind this study.  Section Three discusses previous literature.  Section Four  
presents our theoretical arguments and assumptions and hypotheses which this study is going 
to examine. Section Five describes the data, methods and empirical model used for the main 
analysis, and how I construct my variables from that data. Section Six presents the empirical 
results from my analysis, including some robustness checks.  Section Seven concludes and 
discusses the directions for further work. 
 
II. Purpose: 
Based on the two categories of literature (health disparity literature and the health 
dependence of utility literature, which is discussed in section three): 
1.  There exist race, and ethnicity differences not only in the impact of disease but also in the 
quality of life after disease, efficacy of medications for treatment of the disease, comorbidity 
of various diseases, as well as mortality rate of various chronic diseases.   
2. There exists health state dependence of marginal utility which can be negative as well as 
positive. 
What makes this study different from the previous studies is that this study combines the 
above mentioned two literatures. Our hypothesis is that there is heterogeneity in the health 
state dependence of marginal utility over race, and ethnicity.  In other words, the relationship 
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between health state and marginal utility also varies over race, and ethnicity.  If  there is 
heterogeneity in the marginal utility among different health states over race and ethnicity, the 
policies like Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security would have varying impact on people 
depending upon their race, and ethnicity. Therefore, this study has important implications for 
portfolio allocation, spending, saving, bequests, welfare of elderly women and men, and 
Social Security and Medicare policy.  
 
  III. Previous Literature and Background 
 
I divide the literature for this study into two categories: first is the utility and health 
literature, and the other is race, and ethnicity literature. 
In utility and health literature seminary work has been done by Richard J. Zeckhauser 
(1970, 1973), Kenneth J. Arrow (1974), Viscusi and Evans (1990, 1991a, 1991b) followed by 
Halliday (2008) and Finkelstein et al. (2009, 2011).   In early 1970s Richard J. Zeckhauser 
(1970, 1973), Kenneth J. Arrow (1974) had developed the models of health care in which 
utility functions in the good and the poor health states assumed quite different shapes.  Later 
in the 1990s Viscusi and Evans (1990) using the chemical worker survey (1982)
16
 ascertain 
the findings of  Zeckhauser and Arrow.  Viscusi and Evans find that the marginal utility of 
income depends on the health state.  They elicit the fallacy of monetary equivalence for a job 
injury. The logic behind monetary equivalence is that  the death means fall in income, and 
thereby an  increase in marginal utility of income.  Their study finds that MU of 
                                            
16
  1982 Chemical worker survey is the subsample of workers analyzed in Section III. of Viscusi and O‘Connor 
(1984) 
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income/money falls with the onset of job illness/injury.  They find that  less than full 
insurance is one of the  most appropriate and significant implications of decline in marginal 
utility of income/wealth in ill health state. 
Halliday (2008) studies the  heterogeneity in health state dependence using Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from 1984-1997 on self reported health status. He 
uses this state wide data set containing information on clinical risk factors for cardiac surgery. 
For half of the population he finds modest degree of state dependence whereas for the other 
half he finds degree of health state dependence to be near one but their health status mostly 
does not change over the life span. Author holds that though improvements in medical care 
leads to modest improvements in health, there may be larger potential gains to identifying as 
well as targeting factors that influence individual heterogeneity since the state dependence is 
mostly driven by individual characteristics.  
Finkelstein et al. (2009) discuss various approaches/methods of measuring health 
dependence of marginal utility of consumption.  Finkelstein et al. (2011) find that marginal 
utility of consumption depends on health states.  Using empirical analysis based on Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS) data they find 10 to 25 % decline in the marginal utility of 
consumption due to one standard deviation increase in chronic health condition.  This has 
impact on optimal health insurance levels and life cycle savings.   
The second category of literature (which is more of a medical field literature) is 
related to race, and ethnicity differences in the impact of various diseases, in the quality of 
life after disease, efficacy of medications for treatment of the disease, comorbidity of 
various diseases, as well as mortality rate of various chronic diseases.   
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Ioannidis et al. (2004) test whether race  influences the impact of gene variant on the 
disease risk by examining the genetic effects for 43 gene-disease associations across 697 
study populations of various racial groups. The frequencies of the genetic marker of interest in 
the control populations (58%) showed large heterogeneity across races. However, they also 
found that though  gene-disease associations vary in frequency across populations, but their 
biological impact on the risk for common diseases may usually be consistent across race. 
Ward et. al (2004) using the data from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End 
Results (SEER), (SEER provides data not only on cancer incidence, stage of cancer at 
diagnosis, and mortality, but also on survival for Whites, African Americans, 
Hispanic/Latino, American Indian/Alaskan Native, and Asian/Pacific Islander population) as 
well as using census data on county find the presence of disparities in cancer incidence, 
mortality, and survival in relation to race/ethnicity. Even when census tract poverty rate is 
accounted for, African American, American Indian/Alaskan Native, and Asian/Pacific 
Islander men and African American and American Indian/Alaskan Native women have lower 
five-year survival than non-Hispanic Whites. They find that the death rate from cancer among 
African American males is 1.4 times higher than that among White males; for African 
American females it is 1.2 times higher. The more detailed analyses of selected cancers also 
show even larger variations in cancer survival by race and ethnicity. 
 
IV. Theoretical Framework 
Basic theoretical framework is based on Goddeeris state dependence model and 
Finkelstein‘s model of health state dependence of marginal utility which has been relaxed to 
allow for difference by race and ethnicity. 
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Life time Utility is the sum of: 
1. Current period non-health consumption 
2. Current period health consumption 
3. Expected utility from next period consumption 
 
 
Where Ø = Coefficient of level of sickness 
δ = Discount rate 
θ = Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
γ = Coefficient of relative risk aversion 
S = Level of sickness 
C= Non-health consumption 
H = Out of pocket Health Consumption 
Assumptions: 
1. We assume health status/degree of sickness to be in continuum. 
2. We adopt Epstein-Zin (1989) and Weil (1990) formulation of preferences to allow 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and relative risk aversion to vary independently. 
3. Wealth in the sick state is pre-determined i.e. health shocks do not change wealth. Therefore, 
in empirical analysis we include only those individuals who are no longer in labor market to 
exclude the first order effect of health shock on income. 
59 
 
 
Both healthy and  sick individuals derive utility from health expenditure. Healthy individuals 
derive utility from precautionary health expenditure. 
4. All have health insurance which finances fraction b of health expenditure. It is financed by tax 
rate on permanent income.  
Simplified Two Period Model: 
Suppose an individual lives only two periods. 
Period-1 utility is given by: 
 
Period-2 utility is given by: 
 
Subject to inter temporal budget constraint: 
                                  
Where  r is the real interest rate. 
                                
W is the second period wealth. 
Therefore, 
             
Solving the model backwards:          
 
Subject to : 
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W =                                                                                                 (8)                                                  
Therefore, the optimal non-health consumption expenditure and health consumption 
expenditure in second period will be: 
                                               
                                                                       (10)                                             
By plugging  and  back in the second period utility we will calculate period-2 utility 
for all sickness levels, starting from 0 to the highest level of sickness prevailing in the 
population. Thus, now the second period utility will be a function of second period wealth 
corresponding to all sickness levels. 
              
                                                                                                   (12)             
To calculate expected second period utility, we will take weighted average of second 
period utilities corresponding to all sickness levels, with weights being equal to probability 
‗p‘ of sickness level zero and ‗1- p‘ for all other non-zero sickness levels combined.(We are 
assuming additive utility). Then, we calculate  from life time utility function and inter-
temporal budget constraint in terms of Y and  
 
Parameters in terms of proportionality of Income: 
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We can rewrite this as: 
                                                                                                             (14) 
                                                                                                             
                 
Now we use inter-temporal budget constraint to express expected second period utility as 
a function of first period consumption. 
Inter-temporal budget constraint is: 
                                                                 
               
Substituting this into first period utility:  
                                                                                                                                  
By taking derivative of w.r.t .  and respectively and equating them to zero, we can 
express  and in terms of Y such that: 
                                                                                                      
                                                                                                      
Hence, 
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Where                                          
Deriving Indirect Utility Functions: 
We can derive indirect utility function  by substituting into second period 
utility equations. 
Indirect Utility function for S=0: 
                                                                         
Indirect Utility function for S being non-zero: 
          
Based on these indirect utility functions, the non-linear regression form will be: 
                                                                               
Where is the income gradient of utility in different non-zero sickness levels relative to 
zero sickness level ( . Therefore, 
                 
                                                                                                    
                                                                                                    
By dividing equation (26) by (28) and by plugging in the value derived from dividing 
equation (9) by equation (10) we can calculate  the parameter of health dependent marginal 
utility of consumption ( ).   
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Thus, the ratio between  and gives us state dependence. Thus, the estimate of   
provides us direct test of sign of state dependence. If  is negative, it implies marginal 
utility (in case of happiness as a proxy of utility) declines as the health deteriorates and vice 
versa if we are using CES-D as a proxy of utility. Positive coefficient indicates positive state 
dependence, that is, the difference between marginal utility derived at good health and at the 
poor health is diminishing. Negative coefficient indicates that the difference between 
marginal utility derived at good health and at the poor health is increasing (See Figure 4.1).  
Magnitude of state dependence is measured by   which depends on the ratio of estimated 
coefficients of   and .  Since the denominator of equation – (29) is weakly greater than 
the one if there is no full-insurance, therefore the true magnitude of state dependence will be 
smaller than the  ratio of estimated coefficients of   and . 
Non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition: 
Subsequent upon the findings of our first hypothesis where we test whether health 
dependence of marginal utility varies over race and ethnicity (and we find the strong evidence 
of existence of race and ethnicity heterogeneity), the next objective is to tease out which 
variable causes this heterogeneity in health dependence of utility.  We use the non-linear 
Blinder-Oaxaca (B-O) decomposition to achieve this goal.  The B-O decomposition teases out 
the outcome variables between two groups – (1) a part that is explained by differences in 
observed characteristics, and (2). that part which is attributable to the difference in 
coefficients of these characteristics in the regression equation (in other words, difference in 
returns to these characteristics). Oaxaca-Blinder linear decomposition has been widely used in 
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labor literature but if the outcome variable is non-linear, the standard Oaxaca-Blinder linear 
decomposition is not applicable.  Fairlie (1999, 2003)  developed decomposition method for 
binary dependent variables. Recently  work has been done on non-linear decomposition by 
Sinning, Hahn and Bauer (2008). We apply non-linear B-O decomposition by first estimating 
the logistic regressions separately for whites and blacks and Hispanics and non-hispanics (see 
equations 30 and 31) and then decomposing the difference between the two into explained 
and unexplained components. 
 
 
Where the subscript w refers to whites and b refers to blacks. Similarly we estimate 
equation 30 and 31 for Hispanics and non-hispanics. 
The difference between equations (30) and (31) is decomposed by rewriting the 
conventional decomposition equation in conditional expectation form: 
 
 
 
 
V. Data 
For the analyses I use data on individuals from the Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS).
 
 This is a longitudinal survey started in 1992 that is representative for targeted birth 
cohorts, which I will discuss below.  The core survey is administered every other year, with 
some additional information collected by mail in some of the off-years. 
65 
 
 
The primary information I need for our analysis is household income, household wealth, 
occurrence of health shock, out of pocket medical expenditure.  HRS provides this and much 
more.  I are using all the nine waves (1992 - 2008) of HRS data from RAND HRS and 
Tracker files for our main analysis.  I use a sample with age 50+, who have health insurance 
and  who are either retired or not working (in order to avoid the impact of  gender gap in labor 
market on one hand and the impact of labor market  income on consumption on the other 
hand). I include individuals from the original HRS cohort (born in 1931-41), the Children of 
the Depression Age (CODA) sample (born 1924-30), the War Baby (WB) sample (born 1942-
47), and the Early Baby Boomer (EBB) sample (born 1948-53).  The CODA and WB samples 
were added in 1998 and the EBB sample in 2004.   The CODA sample will have been 
sufficiently old that they are unlikely to be working by 1998, which is the first year of the data 
I are using logged transformation of HH income (Average of HH income over all waves)  + 
5% current HH wealth adjusted for HH composition (divided by 1.7 if coupled and by 1 if 
single).  
    Corresponding with the literature, I do the analyses for seven diseases hypertension, 
stroke, arthritis, cancer, diabetes, chronic lung disease, and heart disease.  For robustness 
check, I repeat the analyses using Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and Instrumental 
Activities of Daily Living (IADLs) from wave 2 onwards (1994—2008)17. Details on cross-
wave difference of ADL and IADL questions can be found in appendix – A.    
For utility measures this study uses the questions on happiness.  As an alternative, I 
use CES-D score which is the sum of feelings like depression, sadness, loneliness etc. Details 
                                            
17
 I exclude wave – 1 for ADL and  IADL based analyses because of inconsistency in the way questions were 
asked in wave – 1 in the survey. 
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on CES-D score can be found in Appendix-4A.  Higher the score, more negative the 
respondent's feelings are in the past week. 
Permanent Income is average of HH income (adjusted for HH composition)
18
 across 
waves 1992 to 2008. I have taken annual HH Income adjusted for HH composition. I also add 
5% of current HH wealth (excluding housing and automobile) to it. Permanent Income  
includes wages and salary, business income, dividend, interest income, other asset income, 
pension, government transfers, other sources.  Details on construction of permanent income 
measure can be found in appendix – B.  Household Wealth includes: net values of stock, 
mutual fund, investment trusts , checking account, saving account, money markets, CD, T-
bill, other savings and assets minus non-housing and non - automobile debts.  Average HH 
wealth is average of wealth over all waves whenever HH enters.  Details on construction of 
wealth measure can be found in appendix – 4B 
 
VI. Results 
I regress subjective happiness (proxy of utility) on health/sickness level, permanent 
income and interaction term of health/sickness level and permanent income. 
Table -4.1 insert here 
Our sample has approx. 40,000 (person years) observations for whites (age over 50, 
not in labor market and have health insurance) and approx. 7000 for blacks and approx. 3000 
observations for hispanics.  Sample statistics are given in (Table 4.1).  The data is tested for 
heteroskedasticity (using ado file xttest3).  Since heteroskedasticity was present, robust 
                                            
18
 I use OECD adjustment for HH size: Divide total HH income by 1.7 if respondent  is married and living with 
spouse in same HH in that wave and divide by 1 if single. 
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standard errors have been used.  Sample was tested for multicollinearity by using stata user 
written Collin command.  I include wave fixed effects in our regression since I failed to reject 
the null of time dummies not jointly significant using testparm command. We use probability 
weights for the analyses. 
Equation (24) is empirically calculated by the running the following fixed effects 
regression: 
)                                                           (33)                                                    
The effect of permanent income on utility gets absorbed by individual fixed effects 
( ), in order to capture that, we run the auxiliary regression of the following type to get the 
coefficient of permanent income: 
                                                                                        (34)                                                                                    
In our baseline model (Table-4.2), we regress utility proxy on the variable ‗number of 
diseases‘ which is the sum of seven health conditions (hypertension, stroke, arthritis, cancer, 
diabetes, chronic lung disease, and  heart disease), interaction between permanent income and 
number of diseases along with other control variables (age, wave fixed effects, individual 
fixed effects, marital status, risk attitude).  The estimates of individual fixed effects derived 
from this regression are regressed on dummy for gender, permanent income (adjusted for HH 
composition), risk attitude, residency and marital status. To estimate the parameter of state 
dependence, the coefficient of interaction term of diseases and log permanent income are 
divided by the coefficient of permanent income (adjusted for HH composition).  I find that 
there is heterogeneity in health state dependence of utility among different races, and 
ethnicities.  
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Table 4.2 insert here 
I find that there is heterogeneity in health state dependence of utility among different 
races and ethnicities also.  For lung disease, stroke and arthritis, the health state dependence is 
positive for whites whereas negative for blacks (table 4.2). For diabetes, stroke and heart 
disease, the health state dependence is positive for Hispanic whereas negative for Non-
hispanic (see table 4.11). 
I find that there is heterogeneity in health state dependence of utility among different 
ethnicities also.  For diabetes, the health state dependence is negative for Hispanic whereas 
positive for Non-hispanic. For arthritis, health state dependence is positive for Hispanic 
whereas negative for non-hispanic (columns 7 and 8: table 4.2).  As mentioned, in the theory 
section, these state dependence coefficients have been derived from the ratio of the interaction 
term of permanent income and health state and the coefficient of permanent income itself, the 
results of these regressions are given in tables-3,4,and 5 respectively. 
Tables 4.3,4.4 and 4.5 insert here. 
However, using ADLs and IADLs we find that the results are not consistent with that of 
objective disease results. One possible explanation is that ADLs and IADLs are subjective 
health measures and there is possible variation in self-reporting of functional limitations 
among races and ethnicities. In general, in the literature, African Americans and Hispanics 
have been found to be reporting worse functional health than whites (Kington and Smith 
1997).  More research is needed in this area before we are able to arrive at any conclusion.  
B-O Decomposition: 
Now, since the results tell us that there is racial-ethnic heterogeneity in health 
dependence of utility,  it is important for us to identify the contribution of observed factors 
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behind racial-ethnic heterogeneity in utility. We use the nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition for the same (See table 4.6). The geometric means of utility proxy (Happiness) 
is 2.41 for whites and 2.33 for blacks which amounts to a difference of 3.6 percent.  Adjusting 
black‘s endowment levels to that of whites would increase black‘s utility by 3.7%.  One 
hundred  percent of the utility gap is explained by the endowment effect. The significant 
contributors towards the explained gap are marital status, number of diseases,  log adjusted 
income, risk attitudes , age gender and ethnicity. We find similar results for B-O 
decomposition based on ethnicity also(See table 4.13). 
(Table 4.6 and 4.13 insert here) 
Taking CES-D score as utility proxy,  we find that the means of CES-D is 1.51 for 
whites and 2.00 for blacks yielding a score gap of 0.49 (See table 4.7).  Adjusting black‘s 
endowment levels to that of whites would lead to mean decline of 0.47 in CES-D score. Thus, 
96 percent of the score gap is explained by endowment levels. We find similar results for B-O 
decomposition based on ethnicity also (See table 4.14). 
(Table 4.7 and 4.14 insert here) 
Robustness Checks: 
Robustness checks have been done using alternative specification logit and by using 
CES-D as an alternative utility proxy (Tables – 4.8 and columns 4 and 5 of tables 4.2 to 4.5). 
The results with logit stand our baseline model results.  Results with CES-D score as a 
disutility proxy (opposite to happiness) also stand our baseline results that health state-
dependence of utility varies over race and ethnicity. Results of regressions of CES-D on 
alternative health measures like ADLs, IADLs and number of diseases have been reported in 
appendix-4C.  
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Tables – 4.8  insert here. 
 
VII. Conclusion and Discussion 
 Using happiness as a utility proxy and seven objective health measures separately as 
well as combined measure as sum total of these seven conditions in our baseline model, we 
find racial-ethnic differences in health dependence of utility.  By B-O decomposition of utility 
we find out that the significant contributors to the racial-ethnic utility gap are marital status, 
number of diseases,  log adjusted income, risk attitudes , age and gender.  
However when we use self-reported health (IADLs) as a measure of health status, the 
results are not consistent to the baseline model results where we used objective health 
condition reports.  One of the  possible explanations is behavioral  difference among race and 
ethnicities in self reporting of functional health.  African-Americans and Hispanics self-report 
the functionality hindrances more. Since, health state dependence is being measured as a ratio 
between the interaction term of  self-reported health × permanent income and permanent 
income, the higher self-report of diseases bias the results for  health state dependence.   
  
The existence of race, and ethnicity differences in health state dependence of utility 
has important implications for portfolio allocation, spending, saving, bequests, welfare of 
elderly women and men, and Social Security and Medicare policy.  It also has implications for 
health insurance.  Our study confirms the findings of Halliday (2008) that  there may be larger 
potential gains to identifying as well as targeting factors that influence individual 
heterogeneity since the health state dependence is mostly driven by individual characteristics, 
as has been found to be the case in B-O decomposition of utility in the current study.  
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Chapter 5. Contributions to the Literature: 
 This dissertation is compilation of chapters on the impact of risk attitude on 
occupational choice on one hand and health dependence of utility on the other hand.  Risk 
attitude has been found to be a significant contributor in gender, racial and ethnic 
heterogeneity in marginal utility as well as a major factor in occupational choice.  This 
dissertation makes following contributions to the literature: 
Contribution in Occupational Choice Literature: 
1) It examines riskiness of jobs and risk tolerance of individuals in two distinct domains of risk: 
health and injury risk and income risk.  Strong evidence is found that the distinction is 
important.  
2)   It constructs riskiness measures of jobs for classification of jobs by both occupation and 
industry.  To our knowledge this has previously been done only for the fatality risk of jobs by 
Viscusi (2004) in his work on the value of a life.  This study claims that the variation in other 
risks (health, income) across industries within occupation categories is potentially large and 
important.   
3) This dissertation is using survey data on a sample of workers who are near the end of their 
work-life.  By the end of the work-life, workers have arguably had more opportunity to attain 
their ideal choice in occupation and industry, as well as having had more opportunity to 
become informed about the risks.  Further, using this older sample allows us to treat 
educational attainment as pre-determined, rather than a decision that is taken jointly with the 
choice of occupation and industry.  
4) Finally, this study addresses whether controlling for time preference impacts the estimated 
effect of risk tolerance on the riskiness of the job category chosen. 
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5) The impact of a subject‘s magnitude of risk and time preference (as well as the changes in risk 
and time preference over the gender and age) on the magnitude and sign of the state 
dependent relationship between health shock and marginal utility of consumption can have 
immense implications for retirement consumption behavior. 
Furthermore, this study makes following general contributions to the risk and time 
preference literature: 
 Provides a measure of riskiness of occupations to the job market candidates. 
 The comprehensive and careful construction of proxies for risk and time preference 
(financial as well as general domain). 
 Estimates the validity of often used proxy for risk and Advice against the use of 
smoking as a proxy for pure financial domain based risk analysis.  
 
Contribution in Health Dependence of Utility Literature: 
1) This dissertation is the first attempt to investigate the presence of heterogeneity in health 
dependence of utility over gender, race and ethnicity. 
2) This dissertation not only investigates the presence of heterogeneity in health dependence of 
utility over gender, race and ethnicity but also is an attempt to find out the factors contributing 
to the heterogeneity. 
3) The finding that risk attitude is a significant contributor to racial-ethnic and gender disparity 
in marginal utility using both happiness as well as CES-D scores as utility proxy, is another 
important contribution of this study in the risk literature as well as health demography 
literature. 
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4) This dissertation confirms the findings of Halliday (2008) that  there may be larger potential 
gains to identifying as well as targeting factors that influence individual heterogeneity since 
the health state dependence is mostly driven by individual characteristics, as has been found 
to be the case in B-O decomposition of utility in the current study. 
5) Since, there is heterogeneity in the variation of utility among different health states, the 
policies like Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security would have varying impact on people 
depending upon race, ethnicity and gender. This study has important implications for portfolio 
allocation, spending, saving, bequests, welfare of elderly women and men, and Social 
Security and Medicare policy. 
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Chapter 6. Appendices: 
6.1  Appendices to Chapter-2 
Appendix 2A : Preference Measurement 
1. Measurement of Risk Preference  
For the financial risk preference measures, we use the questions based on the risk of variation 
in income. 
Wording of HRS question, from 1998: 
―Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family.  Your doctor recommends 
that you move because of allergies, and you have to choose between two possible jobs. 
The first would guarantee your current total family income for life.   
The second is possibly better paying, but the income is also less certain.  There is a 50-
50 chance the second job would double your total lifetime income and a 50-50 chance 
that it would cut it by X.  Which job would you take – the first job or the second job?‖ 
The question sequence begins with X = 1/3 and varies thereafter contingent on responses in 
order to ascertain into which of the 6 ranges the respondent fits. These six ranges are given in 
table 2A.1. 
 
Framework of Time Horizon  
Wording of time horizon question in HRS for 2004: 
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   ―In planning your (family's) saving and spending, which of the following time periods is 
most  important to you  (and your)  (husband\wife\partner), the next few months, the next 
year, the next few years, the next 5-10 years, or longer than 10 years?‖ 
For the analyses, the next few months has been taken as the reference category. 
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6.2  Appendices to Chapter-3 
Appendix 3A : Cross Wave Differences in Activities of Daily Living (ADL) 
Source: RAND HRS Data Documentation, Version K 
 
Two Activities of Daily Living (ADL) summaries were derived beginning in Wave 2.  One 
uses the ADLs proposed  by Wallace and Herzog in their paper (Wallace and Herzog, 1995) 
to define an ADL summary (ADLWA): bathe, dress, and eat.  The second includes these and 
adds getting in/out of bed and walking across a room (ADLA).  In all waves the "some 
difficulty" versions of the individual measures are used to construct these measures, i.e., walk, 
bed, bath, dress, and eat. Each limitation adds one to the summary measure, that is: 
ADLWA = sum (bath, dress, and eat) 
ADLA = sum (walk, bed, bath, dress, and eat) 
Please see "Activities of Daily Living (ADLs): Recodes for Comparison to Wallace and 
Herzog" for a description of how these 0/1 variables ([adl]W) are constructed. Note that the 
Wallace and Herzog variables result in more limitation than the 0/1 recodes for other waves 
(Rw[adl]A) solely due to measurement differences in the raw data. The R1ADLWW and 
R1ADLWA variables are not appropriate for comparison to the RwADLA and RwADLWA 
variables in other waves. 
There are other cross wave differences in the way HRS presented these questions in Wave 2H 
and 2A and the later waves, that may introduce measurement errors in these variables. In 
addition the criteria used for skipping some questions changed between Wave 3 and 
later waves, which may also influence the consistency of measurement before Wave 4 for all 
ADLs except dressing. 
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CES-D Score: 
CES-D is the sum of feeling depressed, everything is an effort, sleep restless, feel lonely, feel 
sad, feel cannot get going, (1 - you were happy) and (1 - enjoy life). Thus the higher the score, 
the more negative the respondent's feelings in the past week.  
 
Cross Wave Differences in Original HRS Data 
Please see "Cross Wave Differences in Original HRS Data" for the "Activities of daily living 
(ADLs): Some difficulty 
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Appendix 3B : Construction of Permanent Income and Household Wealth Measures 
Source: RAND HRS Data Documentation, Version K 
 
Preparing Income data: 
1. Permanent Income is average of HH income (adjusted for HH composition)19 from 
waves 1992 to 2008. 
2. Annual HH Income includes: Wages and salary, Business income, Dividend, Interest 
income, Other asset income, Pension, Government transfers and welfare income, 
income from other sources. 
Then I add 5% of HH current financial wealth.  This is total HH wealth excluding housing. 
 
Income  = wage, salary + tip, bonus and commission income + second job income 
+professional practice and trade income + Business income + Rental income + Dividend 
income + Bonds income + CDs, Saving bonds, T-bills income + Checking, Saving account  
income + Other household income which is income from other assets + Any other HH income 
+ Lump sum income for last calendar year from last calendar year from insurance, pension or 
inheritance + Lump sum income #2 for last calendar year from insurance, pension or 
inheritance + Lump sum income #3 for last calendar year from insurance, pension or 
inheritance + Pension # 1 (largest income) + Pension # 2 (2
nd
 largest income) + Pension # 3 
(rest  income) + Annuity # 1 (largest income ) + Annuity # 2 (2
nd
 largest income ) + Annuity # 
3 (rest  income ) + Welfare Income If not + Food Stamps + Veteran‘s Benefits + Respondent 
or spouse Social Security retirement or survivor‘s income, set to SS. + Respondent or spouse 
                                            
19
 OECD adjustment criterion of dividing total HH income by 1.7 if R is living with spouse in same HH in that 
wave and divide by 1 if single has been used. 
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Social Security disability income and Supplemental Security Income + Unemployment 
income + Worker‘s compensation income  
HH Wealth includes: 
Net values of stock, MF, investment trusts , checking A/c, Saving AC, Money markets, CD, 
T-bill, other savings and assets minus non-housing and non - automobile debts. 
Total non-housing assets less debt  
= Other Real estate + Transportation + Business +Individual Retirement Accounts + Stocks, 
MF + Checking and Saving Account + CDs, Savings Bonds, Treasury Bills + Bonds + Other 
savings, Assets – Debts  
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6.3  Appendices to Chapter-4 
Appendix A : Cross Wave Differences in Activities of Daily Living (ADL) 
Source: RAND HRS Data Documentation, Version K 
 
Two Activities of Daily Living (ADL) summaries were derived beginning in Wave 2. One 
uses the ADLs proposed Wallace and Herzog in their paper (Wallace and Herzog, 1995) to 
define an ADL summary (ADLWA): bathe, dress, and eat. The second includes these and 
adds getting in/out of bed and walking across a room (ADLA). In all waves the "some 
difficulty" versions of the individual measures are used to construct these measures, i.e., walk, 
bed, bath, dress, and eat. Each limitation adds one to the summary measure, that is: 
ADLWA = sum (bath, dress, and eat) 
ADLA = sum (walk, bed, bath, dress, and eat) 
Please see "Activities of Daily Living (ADLs): Recodes for Comparison to Wallace and 
Herzog" for a description of how these 0/1 variables ([adl]W) are constructed. Note that the 
Wallace and Herzog variables result in more limitation than the 0/1 recodes for other waves 
(Rw[adl]A) solely due to measurement differences in the raw data. The R1ADLWW and 
R1ADLWA variables are not appropriate for comparison to the RwADLA and RwADLWA 
variables in other waves. 
There are other cross wave differences in the way HRS presented these questions in Wave 2H 
and 2A and the later waves, that may introduce measurement errors in these variables. In 
addition the criteria used for skipping some questions changed between Wave 3 and 
later waves, which may also influence the consistency of measurement before Wave 4 for all 
ADLs except dressing. 
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CES-D Score: 
CES-D is the sum of feeling depressed, everything is an effort, sleep restless, feel lonely, feel 
sad, feel cannot get going, (1 - you were happy) and (1 - enjoy life). Thus the higher the score, 
the more negative the respondent's feelings in the past week.  
 
Cross Wave Differences in Original HRS Data 
Please see "Cross Wave Differences in Original HRS Data" for the "Activities of daily living 
(ADLs): Some difficulty 
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Appendix B : Construction of Permanent Income and Household Wealth Measures 
 
Source: RAND HRS Data Documentation, Version K 
 
Preparing Income data: 
1. Permanent Income is average of HH income (adjusted for HH composition)20 from 
waves 1992 to 2008. 
2. Annual HH Income includes: Wages and salary, Business income, Dividend, Interest 
income, Other asset income, Pension, Government transfers and welfare income, 
income from other sources. 
Then I add 5% of HH current financial wealth.  This is total HH wealth excluding housing. 
Income  = wage, salary + tip, bonus and commission income + second job income 
+professional practice and trade income + Business income + Rental income + Dividend 
income + Bonds income + CDs, Saving bonds, T-bills income + Checking, Saving account  
income + Other household income which is income from other assets + Any other HH income 
+ Lump sum income for last calendar year from last calendar year from insurance, pension or 
inheritance + Lump sum income #2 for last calendar year from insurance, pension or 
inheritance + Lump sum income #3 for last calendar year from insurance, pension or 
inheritance + Pension # 1 (largest income) + Pension # 2 (2
nd
 largest income) + Pension # 3 
(rest  income) + Annuity # 1 (largest income ) + Annuity # 2 (2
nd
 largest income ) + Annuity # 
3 (rest  income ) + Welfare Income If not + Food Stamps + Veteran‘s Benefits + Respondent 
or spouse Social Security retirement or survivor‘s income, set to SS. + Respondent or spouse 
                                            
20
 OECD adjustment criterion of dividing total HH income by 1.7 if R is living with spouse in same HH in that 
wave and divide by 1 if single has been used. 
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Social Security disability income and Supplemental Security Income + Unemployment 
income + Worker‘s compensation income  
HH Wealth includes: 
Net values of stock, MF, investment trusts , checking A/c, Saving AC, Money markets, CD, 
T-bill, other savings and assets minus non-housing and non - automobile debts. 
Total non-housing assets less debt  
= Other Real estate + Transportation + Business +Individual Retirement Accounts + Stocks, 
MF + Checking and Saving Account + CDs, Savings Bonds, Treasury Bills + Bonds + Other 
savings, Assets – Debts 
  
 
8
4
 
Tables from Chapter-2 
Table 2.1: Income Variability by Occupation and Industry  
 
Source:  Authors‘ calculations using IPUMS 5% census data. The crosswalk available at IPUMS has been used to convert the industries and occupational codes 
into the ones which are compatible with HRS data (1980 Census codes) for the analyses.
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Table 2.2: Nonfatal and Fatal Injury and Illness Rate (per 100,000 employees)  
by Occupation and Industry 
 
 
Table 2A source: authors' calculations using BLS non-fatal injury illness incident data from ―TABLE R44.  Number of 
nonfatal occupational injuries and illnesses involving days away from work by occupation and industry sector, 2004‖. 
Table-2B source: Table 1, Viscusi‘s (2004)  Some industries and occupations have been recoded from Viscusi‘s original 
categories to make them compatible with those in HRS data. We have presently used relative employment in each category in 
1997 in order to scale the rates for combining them.  
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Table 2.3A: Summary Statistics: Means and Proportions 
Risk Aversion  
 
Medium  Risk Averse 
Most Risk Averse 
0.31  
0.55  
Education  
 
High School 
College 
Graduate 
Unknown 
0.26  
0.11  
0.06  
0.006  
Race  
 
Black 
Other 
0.07 
0.05  
Time horizon  
 
One Year 
Next few years 
Next 5- 10 years 
More than 10 years 
0.12 
0.27 
0.37 
0.12  
Marital Status 
 
Previously married 
Never Married 
0.17 
0.05  
Family wealth  
 
Average 
Poor 
Varied 
0.65 
0.25 
0.01 
No Smoking  0.42 
Age  57.9 (6.11) 
Fatal Risk 
Nonfatal Risk 
Income Variability 
 4.07 (3.52) 
1,506 (2,100) 
62,973 (15,177) 
Observations  (1,756)    
Note: Survey weights used.  Std. dev. in parentheses. 
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Table 2.3B: Description of Variables 
Variable Description 
Risk Preference Least risk averse, medium risk averse and most risk averse; 
least risk averse is the reference category. 
 
Time Horizon Next few months, next year, next few years, next 5-10 years, 
more than 10 years; next few months is the reference 
category. 
 
Race White, black and other with white as the reference category. 
 
Marital Status Married, never married and previously married with married 
as the reference category. 
 
Education Less than high school, high school, college, graduate, 
unknown; less than high school is the reference category 
 
Family Wealth Rich, poor, average, varied; rich is the reference category 
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Table 2.4: Regression Estimates of Three Measures of Job Risk 
                              Category Income Variability Nonfatal Rate Fatal Rate 
Risk Aversion             Medium   -0.056*** 
(0.021) 
-0.074 
(0.075) 
-0.063 
(0.055) 
                                      Most -0.064*** 
(0.019) 
0.175** 
(0.073) 
           0.078 
          (0.050) 
Race                              Black 0.081*** 
(0.029) 
0.289*** 
(0.088) 
0.033 
(0.065) 
 Unknown 0.021 
(0.029) 
0.137 
(0.143) 
0.078 
(0.113) 
Degree                     High School -0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.759*** 
(0.065) 
   -0.545*** 
(0.064) 
                                     College -0.017 
(0.013) 
-1.114*** 
(0.067) 
   -0.801*** 
(0.065) 
                                    Graduate -0.018 
(0.014) 
-1.147*** 
(0.051) 
   -1.114*** 
(0.045) 
                                       Other -0.040 
(0.089) 
-1.241*** 
(0.089) 
0.084 
(0.166) 
Family Wealth             Average -0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.097 
(0.097) 
0.083 
(0.088) 
                                        Poor -0.048* 
(0.027) 
0.023 
(0.093) 
0.0294 
(0.096) 
                                       Varied -0.010 
(0.068) 
0.360 
(0.317) 
0.204 
(0.198) 
Time Horizon             Next Year -0.036 
(0.027) 
-0.105 
(0.107) 
0.076 
(0.098) 
                                    Next Few Years -0.054** 
(0.024) 
-0.271*** 
(0.084) 
-0.0004 
(0.077) 
                                    Next 5-10 Years -0.040* 
(0.022) 
-0.149* 
(0.083) 
0.013 
(0.074) 
                                 Longer than 10 yrs -0.053** 
(0.026) 
-0.140 
(0.101) 
0.092 
(0.075) 
Age 0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Marital status         Previously Married 0.016 
(0.018) 
0.211** 
(0.086) 
0.110 
(0.067) 
                                  Never Married 0.012 
(0.026) 
0.163 
(0.113) 
0.0477 
(0.105) 
R
2 
0.03  0.24 0.21 
#Observations (Subpopulation) 1,756 
Notes: Survey weights used. 
            Jackknife Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 2.5: Risk Aversion without Time Preference vs. with Time Preference 
  Income Variability 
    
Risk Aversion              Medium   -0.056** -0.056** 
                                        (0.023) (0.023) 
 Most -0.059*** -0.061*** 
  (0.020) (0.021) 
Degree                    High School -0.004 -0.009 
                                       (0.014) (0.014) 
                                 College -0.021 -0.028** 
                                        (0.014) (0.014) 
 Graduate -0.035** -0.040*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) 
 Unknown -0.024 -0.025 
                             (0.089) (0.081) 
Race    Other Black 0.070** 0.073** 
  (0.028) (0.030) 
 Other 0.025 0.031 
  (0.026) (0.027) 
Time Horizon                                               Next Year -0.038 
                                      (0.026) 
                                  Next Few Years -0.062*** 
  (0.023) 
 Next 5-10 Years -0.044** 
  (0.022) 
 Longer than 10 years -0.053** 
  (0.026) 
 Age    0.004*** 0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Marital status            Previously Married                              0.023 0.024 
  (0.018) (0.018) 
 Never Married 0.027 0.040 
  (0.028) (0.034) 
Family Wealth     Average -0.046* -0.044* 
  (0.024) (0.024) 
 Poor -0.059** -0.056* 
  (0.029) (0.028) 
 Varied -0.025 -0.016 
  (0.067) (0.068) 
Constant   4.037*** 4.004*** 
       (0.080) (0.078) 
         # Observations (Subpopulation)          1,955                  
           Notes: Survey weights used. 
                         Jackknife Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
        
 
90 
 
 
Table 2.6: Smoking as a Proxy for Risk Aversion: Income Variability vs.  Nonfatal  
 
 Control Variables  income  nonfatal 
No smoking  0.021** -0.030 
  (0.009) (0.044) 
Health Index  0.003 0.130 
  (0.027) (0.082) 
Degree                    High School -0.011 -0.856*** 
                                       (0.012) (0.054) 
                                 College -0.039*** -1.207*** 
                                         (0.012) (0.060) 
 Graduate -0.037** -1.269*** 
  
          Unknown 
 
(0.011) 
-0.029 
(0.072) 
(0.043) 
-1.436*** 
(0.236) 
Age  5.40e-05 0.0004 
  (8.92e-05) (0.0003) 
Race     Black 0.063** 0.293*** 
  (0.024) (0.072) 
 Other 0.020 0.212** 
  (0.022) (0.104) 
Marital status           Previously Married                              0.024 0.164*** 
  (0.016) (0.078) 
 Never Married 0.035 0.186* 
  (0.032) (0.100) 
Family Wealth     Average -0.052** 0.150* 
  (0.021) (0.084) 
 Poor -0.060** 0.115 
  (0.024) (0.080) 
 Varied -0.069 0.201 
  (0.062) (0.285) 
Constant  4.165*** 6.951*** 
  (0.024) (0.096) 
         # Observations (Subpopulation)                               2,769                      2,687 
             Notes: Survey weights used. 
                         Jackknife Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Tables from Chapter - 3 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics over Gender 
 Female Male 
Number of Diseases 2.097 (1.319) 2.060 (1.356) 
Hypertension 0.608 (0.488) 0.565 (0.496) 
Diabetes 0.187 (0.390) 0.220 (0.414) 
Cancer 0.154 (0.361) 0.169 (0.375) 
Lung 0.124 (0.330) 0.123 (0.329) 
Heart 0.266 (0.442) 0.346 (0.476) 
Stroke 0.080 (0.271) 0.099 (0.299) 
Arthritis 0.710 (0.454) 0.576 (0.494) 
ADL Wide 0.489 (1.094) 0.390 (0.983) 
ADL 0.290 (0.692) 0.245 (0.640) 
IADL 0.181 (0.579) 0.185 (0.569) 
IADL Wide 0.440 (1.052) 0.351 (0.954) 
Log Permanent Income 10.130 (0.897) 10.258 (0.886) 
Single 0.513 (0.500) 0.227 (0.419) 
White 0.822 (0.382) 0.852 (0.355) 
Age 71.644 (9.640) 71.356 (8.874) 
Risk Attitude 0.122 (0.327) 0.142 (0.350) 
Happiness 0.865 (0.342) 0.892 (0.310) 
Observations 26,700 22,800 
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Table 3.2: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among male-female  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – Number of Diseases 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness Utility Proxy : CESD 
Number of 
Diseases 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
Num_dis 
×Log(Ῡ)  
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
 
-0.009 
(0.021) 
0.023 
(0.021) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.047*** 
(0.004) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
-0.479*** 
(0.023) 
-0.490*** 
(0.023) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/ β3 ) 
 
Num_dis -0.017 
(0.128) 
-0.130 
(0.127) 
-0.028 
(0.029) 
-0.042 
(0.041) 
Implied State Dependence (β1/ β3 ) with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
Num_dis 1  1.000*** 
(0.008) 
0.992*** 
(0.007) 
1.160*** 
(0.045) 
1.143*** 
(0.040) 
Num_dis 2 0.974*** 
(0.008) 
0.976*** 
(0.007) 
1.387*** 
(0.047) 
1.343*** 
(0.041) 
Num_dis 3 0.958*** 
(0.009) 
0.959*** 
(0.008) 
1.610*** 
(0.051) 
1.560*** 
(0.045) 
Num_dis 4 0.928*** 
(0.010) 
0.934*** 
(0.009) 
1.981*** 
(0.060) 
1.878*** 
(0.053) 
Num_dis 5 0.899*** 
(0.016) 
0.903*** 
(0.014) 
2.167*** 
(0.089) 
2.168*** 
(0.076) 
Num_dis 6 0.906*** 
(0.033) 
0.844*** 
(0.027) 
2.569*** 
(0.183) 
2.619*** 
(0.148) 
Num_dis 7 0.873*** 
(0.166) 
0.862*** 
(0.075) 
1.649* 
(0.864) 
2.146*** 
(0.394) 
N 26,677 22,721 26,053 22,009 
R
2 
0.121 0.089 0.084 0.165 
Within Person Std Dev of Num_Dis                     0.601                0.679                                                 
Ratio of margins σ(β1/ β3 ) 
 
Num_dis 0.601*** 
(0.002) 
0.678*** 
(0.002) 
0.638*** 
(0.011) 
0.751*** 
(0.010) 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 3.3: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among male-female  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – Seven Health Conditions 
Health Issue Utility Proxy : Happiness Utility Proxy : CESD 
 Female Male Female Male 
Hypertension 
×Log(Ῡ)  
-0.023* 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
 
-0.084 
(0.052) 
-0.155** 
(0.066) 
 
Diabetes×Log(Ῡ) 
 
0.025 
(0.017) 
-0.029* 
(0.015) 
0.278*** 
(0.078) 
0.006 
(0.070) 
Cancer×Log(Ῡ)  -0.006 
(0.018) 
-0.041** 
(0.019) 
0.051 
(0.076) 
-0.189*** 
(0.070) 
Lung×Log(Ῡ)  -0.002 
(0.0019) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
0.313*** 
(0.116) 
0.239** 
(0.096) 
Heart×Log(Ῡ)  -0.031** 
(0.013) 
-0.024* 
(0.012) 
-0.070 
(0.061) 
0.117** 
(0.059) 
Stroke×Log(Ῡ)  0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.011 
(0.024) 
-0.154 
(0.124) 
0.266 
(0.180) 
Arthritis×Log(Ῡ) 
 
0.018 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.042 
(0.067) 
0.046 
(0.055) 
Log(Ῡ)  0.046*** 
(0.004) 
0.031*** 
(0.004) 
-0.623*** 
(0.024) 
-0.446*** 
(0.024) 
 
N 25,259 21,763 24,652 20,389 
R
2 
0.085 0.498 0.197 0.081 
Implied State Dependence (β1/ β3 ) 
 
Hypertension 0.200 
(1.376) 
[-2.50 to 2.90] 
0.294 
(8.440) 
[-16.25 to 16.83] 
0.188 
(0.148) 
[-0.10 to 0.47] 
0.290 
(0.153) 
[-0.01 to 0.59] 
Diabetes -0.741 
(2.180) 
[-5.01 to 3.53] 
-1.158 
(2.415) 
[-5.89 to 3.57] 
-0.678 
(0.202) 
[-1.07 to -0.28] 
-0.004 
(0.178) 
[-0.35 to 0.34] 
Cancer 0.170 
(1.357) 
[-2.49 to 2.83] 
-0.210 
(0.625) 
[-1.44 to 1.01] 
0.008 
(0.200) 
[-0.38 to 0.40] 
0.411 
(0.183) 
[0.05 to 0.77] 
Lung 0.211 
(0.824) 
[-1.40 to 1.83] 
-0.234 
(3.041) 
[-6.19 to 5.72] 
-0.273 
(0.255) 
[-0.77 to 0.22] 
-0.225 
(0.231) 
[-0.68 to 0.23] 
Heart -0.534 
(1.100) 
[-2.69 to 1.62] 
-0.188 
(0.526) 
[-1.22 to 0.84] 
0.145 
(0.169) 
[-0.19 to 0.48] 
-0.270 
(0.133) 
[-0.53 to -0.01] 
Stroke 0.031 
(0.851) 
[-1.64 to 1.70] 
-0.493 
(0.890) 
[-2.24 to 1.25] 
0.171 
(0.331) 
[-0.48 to 0.82] 
-0.511 
(0.331) 
[-1.16 to 0.14] 
Arthritis 0.516 
(0.891) 
[-1.23 to 2.26] 
0.216 
(1.928) 
[-3.56 to 3.99] 
0.296 
(0.211) 
[-0.12 to 0.71] 
-0.085 
(0.129) 
[-0.34 to 0.17] 
Notes:   
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1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 3.4: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among male-female  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – ADL Wide 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness 
 
Utility Proxy : CESD 
 
Health 
Indicator : 
ADL 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
adl ×Log(Ῡ)  -0.023*** 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
 
0.004 
(0.027) 
-0.034 
(0.042) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.040*** 
(0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.465*** 
(0.022) 
-0.402*** 
(0.023) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 
adl -0.412 
(0.164) 
0.309 
(0.417) 
-0.083 
(0.058) 
0.101 
(0.073) 
Ratio of Margins with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
adl 1 0.967*** 
(0.008) 
0.969*** 
(0.009) 
1.403*** 
(0.041) 
1.384*** 
(0.039) 
adl 2 0.932*** 
(0.013) 
0.954*** 
(0.014) 
1.719*** 
(0.062) 
1.652*** 
(0.062) 
adl 3 0.915*** 
(0.019) 
0.942*** 
(0.019) 
1.939*** 
(0.090) 
1.839*** 
(0.088) 
adl 4 0.851*** 
(0.024) 
0.915*** 
(0.025) 
2.173*** 
(0.118) 
2.216*** 
(0.113) 
adl 5 0.846*** 
(0.038) 
0.791*** 
(0.041) 
2.107*** 
(0.184) 
2.669*** 
(0.184) 
N 26,204 22,116 26,249 22,158 
R
2 
0.310 0.610 0.302 0.440 
Within Person 
Std Dev  
0.605 0.572   
Ratio of Margins σ(β1/β3) 
 
 0.586*** 
(0.002) 
0.557*** 
(0.002) 
0.789*** 
(0.011) 
0.753*** 
(0.010) 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 3.5: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among male-female  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – IADL Wide 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness 
 
Utility Proxy : CESD 
Health 
Indicator : 
iADL wide 
Female Male Female Male 
IADL ×Log(Ῡ) 
 
-0.031*** 
(0.007) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
 
0.109*** 
(0.035) 
0.036 
(0.034) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.050*** 
(0.004) 
0.033*** 
(0.004) 
-0.568*** 
(0.023) 
-0.425*** 
(0.023) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 
IADL -0.484 
(0.140) 
-0.393 
(0.233) 
-0.197 
(0.062) 
-0.062 
(0.097) 
Ratio of margins with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
IADL 1 0.969*** 
(0.009) 
0.958*** 
(0.009) 
1.342*** 
(0.046) 
1.303*** 
(0.042) 
IADL 2 0.912*** 
(0.013) 
0.960*** 
(0.017) 
1.609*** 
(0.065) 
1.563*** 
(0.076) 
IADL 3 0.943*** 
(0.023) 
0.939*** 
(0.024) 
1.678*** 
(0.111) 
1.915*** 
(0.109) 
IADL 4 0.919*** 
(0.032) 
0.895*** 
(0.033) 
2.106*** 
(0.158) 
1.571*** 
(0.148) 
IADL 5 0.936*** 
(0.038) 
0.723*** 
(0.045) 
1.542*** 
(0.187) 
2.369*** 
(0.205) 
N 25,413 21,007 25,458 21,045 
R
2 
0.385 0.566 0.302 0.440 
Within Person 
Std Dev of 
IADL 
0.604 0.573   
Ratio of Margins σ(β1/β3) 
 
 0.588*** 
(0.002) 
0.554*** 
(0.002) 
0.751*** 
(0.012) 
0.719*** 
(0.012) 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard 
errors for diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, 
census region, marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not 
being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of 
permanent income (β3). 
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Table 3.6:  Non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of Utility Heterogeneity among Men and 
Women using HRS 1992-2008. 
Utility Proxy : 
Happiness 
Male-female 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With number 
of diseases 
 
Male-female 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With ADLs 
 
Male-female 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
ADLs 
 
Male-female 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With IADLs 
 
Male-female 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
IADLs 
 
Total 
Disparity 
 
2.8*** 
(0.003) 
2.7*** 
(0.003) 
2.6*** 
(0.003) 
2.6*** 
(0.003) 
2.5*** 
(0.003) 
Portion due to 
Difference in 
Coefficients 
 
2.2*** 
(0.001) 
2.1*** 
(0.001) 
2.2*** 
(0.001) 
1.8*** 
(0.001) 
2.3*** 
(0.001) 
Portion due to 
Difference in 
Endowments 
0.55* 
(0.003) 
0.47 
(0.003) 
0.34 
(0.003) 
0.71** 
(0.003) 
0.15 
(0.003) 
 
Health 
Indicator 
0.09*** 
(0.0002) 
0.21*** 
(0.0003) 
0.36*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.09** 
(0.0001) 
0.33*** 
(0.0003) 
 
Log Income 
0.34*** 
(0.0004) 
0.31*** 
(0.0004) 
0.29*** 
(0.0004) 
0.36*** 
(0.0003) 
0.34*** 
(0.0004) 
 
Age 
-0.01 
(0.0001) 
0.004 
(0.0001) 
0.003 
(0.0001) 
0.004 
(0.0001) 
0.03 
(0.0002) 
 
Race 
-0.01 
(0.0005) 
-0.10 
(0.00005) 
-0.01 
(0.0006) 
-0.01 
(0.0005) 
-0.01 
(0.00005) 
 
Risk Attitude 
-0.11*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.11*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.11*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.11*** 
(0.0001) 
 
Region 
0.001 
(0.00002) 
0.002 
(0.00002) 
0.002 
(0.00002) 
0.002 
(0.00002) 
0.003 
(0.00003) 
 
Marital Status 
1.7*** 
(0.001) 
1.7*** 
(0.001) 
1.7*** 
(0.001) 
1.6*** 
(0.001) 
1.7*** 
(0.001) 
 
Ethnicity 
-0.10*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0001) 
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Table 3.7 :  Linear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of Utility Heterogeneity among Men 
and Women using HRS 1992-2008. 
 
Utility Proxy 
: CES-D 
Male-female 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With number 
of diseases 
 
Male-female 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With ADLs 
 
Male-female 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
ADLs 
 
Male-female 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With IADLs 
 
Male-female 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
IADLs 
 
 
Total 
Disparity 
 
 
-0.393*** 
(0.018) 
 
-0.393*** 
(0.018) 
 
-0.394*** 
(0.018) 
 
-0.394*** 
(0.018) 
 
-0.391*** 
(0.018) 
Portion due 
to Difference 
in 
Coefficients 
-0.205*** 
(0.008) 
-0.221*** 
(0.009) 
-0.237*** 
(0.009) 
-0.198*** 
(0.008) 
-0.244*** 
(0.009) 
Portion due 
to Difference 
in 
Endowments 
-0.188*** 
(0.018) 
-0.172*** 
(0.017) 
-0.157*** 
(0.017) 
-0.195*** 
(0.018) 
-0.146*** 
(0.018) 
 
Health 
Indicator 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.032*** 
(0.004) 
-0.057*** 
(0.053) 
0.006*** 
(0.003) 
-0.049*** 
(0.004) 
 
Log Income 
-0.063*** 
(0.004) 
-0.061*** 
(0.003) 
-0.057*** 
(0.003) 
-0.068*** 
(0.004) 
-0.064*** 
(0.004) 
 
Age 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
 
Race 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 
Risk Attitude 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
Region 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
 
Marital 
Status 
-0.143*** 
(0.006) 
-0.134*** 
(0.006) 
-0.123*** 
(0.006) 
-0.143*** 
(0.006) 
-0.135*** 
(0.006) 
 
Ethnicity 
0.002*** 
(0.0007) 
0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneity of utility among male-female  by Logit : Dependent Variable – 
Happiness 
 
Health 
Indicator  
 
Number 
of 
Diseases 
 
ADL 
 
IADL 
 
ADL Wide 
 
IADL 
Wide 
Female 
Health State 
×Log(Ῡ)  
-0.032 
(0.039) 
-0.094 
(0.064) 
 
-0.091*** 
(0.087) 
-0.109*** 
(0.045) 
 
-0.130*** 
(0.051) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  -0.066*** 
(0.0005) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
 
-0.028 
(0.002) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 
 1.967 6.216 6.400 6.936 9.121 
Ratio of margins 
 0.998*** 
(0.042) 
0.715*** 
(0.057) 
0.814*** 
(0.074) 
0.744*** 
(0.040) 
0.785*** 
(0.045) 
N 7,650 7,421 7,421 7,421 7,060 
R
2 
0.986 0.556 0.784 0.405 0.462 
Within Person 
Std Dev 
0.601 0.398 0.355 0.605 0.604 
Male 
Health State 
×Log(Ῡ)  
-0.075** 
(0.040) 
0.024*** 
(0.075) 
 
-0.150*** 
(0.023) 
0.046 
(0.050) 
 
-0.069 
(0.061) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  -0.139*** 
(0.001) 
0.039*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.068*** 
(0.003) 
 
-0.028 
(0.002) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 2.552 -1.206 6.444 -2.113 2.987 
Ratio of margins 
  0.928*** 
(0.048) 
0.746*** 
(0.068) 
0.650*** 
(0.087) 
0.792*** 
(0.046) 
0.706*** 
(0.056) 
N 5,761 5,443 5,441 5,443 5,057 
R
2 
0.950 0.830 0.803 0.749 0.640 
Within Person 
Std Dev  
0.679 0.382 0.357 0.572 0.573 
Notes: 
1. Regression uses fixed effects logit in a panel setting and reports robust standard errors for diseases and 
interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, age, hh size, dummy for race, ethnicity, marital status 
were used as controls but not being reported here.   
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression. Jackknife standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. 
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3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent income 
(β3). 
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Tables from Chapter-4: 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics over Race and Ethnicity: Mean and Standard 
Deviation 
 Black White 
Number of Diseases 2.321 (1.330) 2.039 (1.332) 
Hypertension 0.749 (0.434) 0.560 (0.385) 
Diabetes 0.315 (0.464) 0.181 (0.410) 
Cancer 0.123 (0.329) 0.169 (0.375) 
Lung 0.098 (0.298) 0.129 (0.335) 
Heart 0.282 (0.450) 0.308 (0.462) 
Stroke 0.118 (0.323) 0.084 (0.277) 
Arthritis 0.690 (0.462) 0.639 (0.480) 
ADLA 0.672 (1.266) 0.401 (0.995) 
ADLWA 0.406 (0.805) 0.244 (0.638) 
IADLA 0.258 (0.673) 0.169 (0.553) 
IADLZA 0.575 (1.197) 0.367 (0.968) 
Log Permanent Income 9.645 (0.752) 10.297 (0.877) 
Single 0.540 (0.498) 0.348 (0.476) 
Hispanic 
Risk Attitude 
0.016 (0.125) 
0.159 (0.365) 
0.067 (0.251) 
0.126 (0.332) 
Observations 7,700 41, 000 
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Table 4.2: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among whites-blacks  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – Number of Diseases 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness Utility Proxy : CESD 
Number of 
Diseases 
 
White 
 
Black 
 
White 
 
Black 
Num_dis 
×Log(Ῡ)  
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
 
0.018 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.047) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.490*** 
(0.018) 
-0.566*** 
(0.053) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/ β3 ) 
 
 -0.048 
(0.097) 
-0.152 
(2.920) 
 
-0.019 
(0.031) 
-0.025 
(0.078) 
 
Ratio of Margins with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
Num_dis 1  0.525 
(2.378) 
1.365*** 
(0.300) 
0.084 
(6.942) 
1.183*** 
(0.215) 
Num_dis 2 0.693*** 
(0.301) 
1.305*** 
(0.258) 
-0.587 
(3.176) 
1.119*** 
(0.240) 
Num_dis 3 0.988*** 
(0.337) 
-2.556 
(28.11) 
231.187 
(220257) 
0.838*** 
(0.197) 
Num_dis 4 0.960* 
(0.524) 
1.114*** 
(0.195) 
0.269 
(1.196) 
0.842*** 
(0.166) 
Num_dis 5 1.116 
(1.046) 
- 2.432 
(3.403) 
- 
Num_dis 6 1.430*** 
(0.516) 
- 1.322*** 
(0.101) 
- 
N 41,630 6,995 40,532 6,844 
R
2 
0.030 0.332 0.018 0.007 
Within Person 
Std Dev  
0.598 0.623   
Ratio of Margins σ(β1/ β3 ) 
 
Num_dis 0.605*** 
(0.003) 
0.663*** 
(0.009) 
0.633*** 
(0.015) 
0.730*** 
(0.051) 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 4.3: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among whites-blacks  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – Seven Health Conditions 
Health Issue Utility Proxy : Happiness Utility Proxy : CESD 
 White Black White Black 
Hypertension 
×Log(Ῡ)  
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.0001 
(0.027) 
 
-0.070 
(0.047) 
0.072 
(0.140) 
 
Diabetes×Log(Ῡ) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.012) 
-0.100** 
(0.040) 
0.069 
(0.062) 
0.717*** 
(0.180) 
Cancer×Log(Ῡ) 
 
0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.042) 
-0.096* 
(0.056) 
-0.741*** 
(0.275) 
Lung×Log(Ῡ)  0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.025 
(0.038) 
0.044 
(0.078) 
0.915** 
(0.338) 
Heart×Log(Ῡ)  -0.029*** 
(0.009) 
0.027 
(0.030) 
0.012 
(0.050) 
-0.247 
(0.191) 
Stroke×Log(Ῡ) 
 
0.004 
(0.019) 
-0.187*** 
(0.054) 
-0.086 
(0.096) 
0.369 
(0.506) 
Arthritis×Log(Ῡ) 
 
0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.042 
(0.037) 
-0.094* 
(0.053) 
0.264 
(0.161) 
Log(Ῡ)  0.021*** 
(0.003) 
0.130*** 
(0.009) 
-0.372*** 
(0.019) 
-1.128*** 
(0.055) 
 
N 38,912 6,628 38,398 6,374 
R
2 
0.167 0.160 0.074 0.233 
Implied State Dependence (β1/ β3 ) 
 
  (0.191) (0.078) 
Hypertension 0.220 
[-1.10 to 1.54] 
0.492 
[-8.42 to 9.41] 
0.234 
[-0.07 to 0.54] 
0.370 
[-0.99 to 1.73] 
Diabetes -0.644 
[-5.14 to 3.85] 
-1.345 
[-37.42 to 34.72] 
-0.249 
[-0.60 to 0.10] 
-1.031 
[-1.68 to -0.38] 
Cancer -0.037 
[-1.28 to 1.21] 
1.115 
[-496 to 499] 
0.184 
[-0.12 to 0.49] 
1.108 
[-0.48 to 2.70] 
Lung 0.241 
[-3.82 to 4.31] 
-1.077 
[-5.62 to 3.46] 
-0.213 
[-0.56 to 0.13] 
-0.743 
[-1.73 to 0.24] 
Heart -0.249 
[-2.06 to 1.56] 
0.114 
[-5.94 to 6.17] 
-0.071 
[-0.30 to 0.16] 
0.383 
[-0.14 to 0.90] 
Stroke 0.026 
[-1.40 to 1.46] 
-2.518 
[-41 to 36] 
-0.007 
[-0.63 to 0.62] 
-0.791 
[-2.34 to 0.76] 
Arthritis 0.302 
[-7.24 to 7.85] 
-0.037 
[-5.34 to 5.27] 
0.117 
[-0.18 to 0.42] 
0.090 
[-0.49 to 0.67] 
Notes:   
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1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 4.4: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among whites-blacks  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – ADL 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness 
 
Utility Proxy : CESD 
 
ADL 
 
White  
 
Black   
 
White 
 
Black   
adl ×Log(Ῡ)  -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.015 
(0.024) 
0.030 
(0.046) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.034*** 
(0.003) 
0.045*** 
(0.009) 
-0.428*** 
(0.018) 
-0.652*** 
(0.051) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 
 -0.310* 
(0.180) 
-0.060 
(0.047) 
 
-0.011 
(0.062) 
-0.048 
(0.082) 
 
Ratio of Margins with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
adl 1 -8.255 
(134.288) 
1.012 
(2.184) 
3.505*** 
(1.755) 
11.103 
(132.006) 
adl 2 -10.897 
(50.861) 
0.956*** 
(0.149) 
31.199 
(199.153) 
1.039*** 
(0.363) 
adl 3 2.955 
(2.695) 
0.788*** 
(0.129) 
9.976 
(25.602) 
-0.571 
(1.463) 
adl 4 2.671 
(17.891) 
1.038*** 
(0.147) 
-8.989 
(45.200) 
1.387*** 
(0.184) 
adl 5 1.334 
(1.027) 
1.324*** 
(0.100) 
-0.482 
(4.556) 
1.674*** 
(0.243) 
N 40,157 6,728 40,302 6,778 
R
2 
0.109 0.305 0.162 0.286 
Within Person 
Std Dev (ADL) 
0.581 0.724   
Ratio of Margins σ(β1/β3) 
 
 0.587*** 
(0.004) 
0.564*** 
(0.008) 
0.791*** 
(0.018) 
0.750*** 
(0.047) 
 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 4.5: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among whites-blacks  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – IADL 
 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness 
 
Utility Proxy : CESD 
IADL wide White  Black   White Black   
IADL ×Log(Ῡ) 
 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
 
0.025 
(0.029) 
0.187* 
(0.097) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.036*** 
(0.003) 
0.035*** 
(0.009) 
-0.430*** 
(0.018) 
-0.798*** 
(0.052) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 
 -0.563*** 
(0.135) 
0.081 
(0.628) 
 
-0.134*** 
(0.055) 
-0.224** 
(0.123) 
 
Ratio of Margins with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
IADL 1 -9.734 
(46.229) 
1.542 
(1.828) 
-0.381 
(3.165) 
5.069 
(9.892) 
IADL 2 -235.234 
(44041) 
0.999*** 
(0.226) 
0.392 
(1.951) 
0.771*** 
(0.194) 
IADL 3 2.417 
(7.965) 
0.731*** 
(0.138) 
2.947 
(2.838) 
11.364 
(70.849) 
IADL 4 1.667*** 
(0.710) 
1.696*** 
(0.023) 
1.852* 
(0.993) 
1.447** 
(0.760) 
IADL 5 3.228*** 
(0.396) 
0.301 
(0.992) 
13.420 
(46.062) 
1.673*** 
(0.236) 
N 38,665 6,410 39,083 6,470 
R
2 
0.271 0.648 0.208 0.206 
Within Person 
Std Dev IADL 
0.590 0.679   
Ratio of Margins σ(β1/β3) 
 
 0.589*** 
(0.004) 
-0.583*** 
(0.012) 
0.751*** 
(0.018) 
0.721*** 
(0.076) 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 4.6:  Non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of Utility Heterogeneity among 
Blacks and Whites using HRS 1992-2008. 
Utility Proxy 
: Happiness 
Black-White 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With number 
of diseases 
 
Black-White 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With ADLs 
 
Black-White 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
ADLs 
 
Black-White 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With IADLs 
 
Black-White 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
IADLs 
 
Total 
Disparity 
 
3.6*** 
(0.005) 
3.8*** 
(0.005) 
3.8*** 
(0.005) 
3.8*** 
(0.005) 
3.7*** 
(0.005) 
Portion due 
to Difference 
in 
Coefficients 
 
3.7*** 
(0.002) 
4.0*** 
(0.002) 
4.0*** 
(0.002) 
3.6*** 
(0.002) 
3.7*** 
(0.002) 
Portion due 
to Difference 
in 
Endowments 
-0.10 
(0.005) 
-0.10 
(0.005) 
-0.10 
(0.005) 
0.10 
(0.005) 
0.05 
(0.005) 
 
Health 
Indicator 
0.60*** 
(0.0005) 
0.86*** 
(0.0006) 
1.1*** 
(0.0008) 
0.31*** 
(0.004) 
0.65*** 
(0.0006) 
 
Log Income 
1.5*** 
(0.001) 
1.4*** 
(0.001) 
1.3*** 
(0.001) 
1.6*** 
(0.001) 
1.4*** 
(0.001) 
 
Age 
0.37*** 
(0.0005) 
0.36*** 
(0.0004) 
0.36*** 
(0.0004) 
0.37*** 
(0.0004) 
0.38*** 
(0.0004) 
 
Gender 
0.03* 
(0.0002) 
0.03 
(0.0002) 
0.02 
(0.0003) 
0.05*** 
(0.0002) 
0.01 
(0.0002) 
 
Risk Attitude 
0.11*** 
(0.0002) 
0.11*** 
(0.0002) 
0.10*** 
(0.0002) 
0.09*** 
(0.0002) 
0.09*** 
(0.0002) 
 
Region 
0.01 
(0.0002) 
0.02 
(0.0002) 
0.03* 
(0.0002) 
0.02 
(0.0002) 
0.03* 
(0.0002) 
 
Marital 
Status 
1.2*** 
(0.0009) 
1.3*** 
(0.0009) 
1.3*** 
(0.0009) 
1.3*** 
(0.0009) 
1.3*** 
(0.0009) 
 
Ethnicity 
-0.10*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0003) 
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Table 4.7:  Linear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of Utility Heterogeneity among 
Blacks and Whites using HRS 1992-2008. 
Utility Proxy 
: CES-D 
Black-White 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With number 
of diseases 
Black-White 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With ADLs 
 
Black-White 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
ADLs 
 
Black-White 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With IADLs 
 
Black-White 
utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
IADLs 
 
 
Total 
Disparity 
 
 
-0.492*** 
(0.027) 
 
-0.492*** 
(0.027) 
 
-0.492*** 
(0.027) 
 
-0.492*** 
(0.027) 
 
-0.478*** 
(0.028) 
Portion due 
to Difference 
in 
Coefficients 
-0.471*** 
(0.012) 
-0.501*** 
(0.014) 
-0.511*** 
(0.014) 
-0.457*** 
(0.012) 
-0.462*** 
(0.013) 
Portion due 
to Difference 
in 
Endowments 
-0.021 
(0.027) 
0.008 
(0.027) 
0.019 
(0.026) 
-0.035 
(0.027) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
 
Health 
Indicator 
-0.079*** 
(0.005) 
-0.123*** 
(0.008) 
-0.154*** 
(0.010) 
-0.043*** 
(0.005) 
-0.092*** 
(0.007) 
 
Log Income 
-0.259*** 
(0.008) 
-0.250*** 
(0.008) 
-0.234*** 
(0.008) 
-0.277*** 
(0.008) 
-0.243*** 
(0.008) 
 
Age 
-0.026*** 
(0.003) 
-0.023*** 
(0.002) 
-0.022*** 
(0.002) 
-0.024*** 
(0.002) 
-0.026*** 
(0.003) 
 
Gender 
-0.013* 
(0.002) 
-0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
Risk Attitude 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
 
Region 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
 
Marital 
Status 
-0.103*** 
(0.005) 
-0.097*** 
(0.005) 
-0.093*** 
(0.005) 
-0.103*** 
(0.005) 
-0.096*** 
(0.005) 
 
Ethnicity 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
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Table 4.8:  Heterogeneity of utility among black-white  by Logit : Dependent Variable – 
Happiness 
 
 
Health 
Indicator 
 
Number 
of 
Diseases 
 
ADL 
 
IADL 
 
ADL Wide 
 
IADL 
Wide 
White 
Health State 
×Log(Ῡ)  
-0.032 
(0.039) 
-0.094 
(0.064) 
 
-0.091*** 
(0.087) 
-0.109*** 
(0.045) 
 
-0.130*** 
(0.051) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  -0.066*** 
(0.0005) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
 
-0.028 
(0.002) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 
 2.601 5.408 9.173 3.871 8.157 
N 7,650 7,421 7,421 7,421 7,060 
R
2 
0.986 0.556 0.784 0.405 0.462 
Within 
Person Std 
Dev 
0.601 0.398 0.355 0.605 0.604 
Black 
Health State 
×Log(Ῡ)  
-0.075** 
(0.040) 
0.024*** 
(0.075) 
 
-0.150*** 
(0.023) 
0.046 
(0.050) 
 
-0.069 
(0.061) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  -0.139*** 
(0.001) 
0.039*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.068*** 
(0.003) 
 
-0.028 
(0.002) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 0.208 -9.699 0.908 -4.525 -3.881 
Ratio of Margins 
 0.928*** 
(0.048) 
0.746*** 
(0.068) 
0.650*** 
(0.087) 
0.792*** 
(0.046) 
0.706*** 
(0.056) 
N 5,761 5,443 5,441 5,443 5,057 
R
2 
0.950 0.830 0.803 0.749 0.640 
Within 
Person Std 
Dev 
0.679 0.382 0.357 0.572 0.573 
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Table 4.9: Summary Statistics over Ethnicity 
 Hispanic Non Hispanic 
Number of Diseases 1.923 (1.290) 2.090 (1.339) 
Hypertension 0.591 (0.492) 0.588 (0.492) 
Diabetes 0.307 (0.461) 0.196 (0.396) 
Cancer 0.093 (0.290) 0.166 (0.372) 
Lung 0.078 (0.268) 0.127 (0.333) 
Heart 0.212 (0.409) 0.310 (0.462) 
Stroke 0.071 (0.257) 0.090 (0.287) 
Arthritis 0.606 (0.489) 0.649 (0.477) 
ADL Wide 0.609 (1.226) 0.431 (1.030) 
ADL 0.365 (0.772) 0.262 (0.660) 
IADL 0.272 (0.693) 0.177 (0.564) 
IADL Wide 0.517 (1.167) 0.391 (0.996) 
Log Permanent Income 9.475 (0.755) 10.241 (0.881) 
Single 0.375 (0.484) 0.378 (0.485) 
White 0.869 (0.337) 0.834 (0.372) 
Age 70.370 (8.585) 71.587 (9.328) 
Risk Attitude 0.135 (0.342) 0.131 (0.338) 
Happiness 0.815 (0.388) 0.882 (0.323) 
Observations 3,200 45,600 
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Table 4.10: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among Hispanic-
Nonhispanic  by WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – Number of Diseases 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness Utility Proxy : CESD 
Number of 
Diseases 
 
Hispanic 
 
Non-Hispanic 
 
Hispanic 
 
Non-Hispanic 
Num_dis 
×Log(Ῡ)  
-0.013 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
 
-0.030 
(0.084) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.063*** 
(0.013) 
0.041*** 
(0.003) 
-
0.546*** 
(0.086) 
-0.524*** 
(0.017) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/ β3 ) 
 
 -0.237 
(0.204) 
-0.061 
(0.082) 
 
-0.040 
(0.124) 
 
-0.037 
(0.028) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/ β3 ) with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
Num_dis 1 0.940 
(1.469) 
-8.039 
(65.620) 
0.058 
(4.613) 
0.927*** 
(0.422) 
Num_dis 2 0.560 
(0.830) 
17.891 
(271.9) 
-0.945 
(5.625) 
1.002*** 
(0.319) 
Num_dis 3 0.945*** 
(0.183) 
3.220 
(4.011) 
1.339 
(0.908) 
2.402 
(3.960) 
Num_dis 4 1.231 
(1.160) 
0.710*** 
(0.246) 
0.201 
(1.927) 
1.753*** 
(0.367) 
Num_dis 5 1.066 
(0.676) 
0.865*** 
(0.328) 
1.654** 
(0.869) 
2.567 
(1.709) 
Num_dis 6 1.243*** 
(0.325) 
-0.273 
(23.680) 
1.357*** 
(0.089) 
1.682*** 
(0.311) 
Num_dis 7 - 0.581 
(1.141) 
- -0.072 
(2.305) 
N 3,096 46,216 3,019 45,287 
R
2 
0.308 0.037 0.064 0.225 
Within Person 
Std Dev  
0.633 0.640   
State Dependence σ(β1/ β3 ) 
 
Num_dis 0.639*** 
(0.013) 
0.642*** 
(0.003) 
0.701*** 
(0.077) 
0.673*** 
(0.015) 
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 4.11: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among Hispanic-
Nonhispanic  by WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – Seven Health 
Conditions 
Health Issue Utility Proxy : Happiness Utility Proxy : CESD 
 Hispanic Non-Hispanic Hispanic Non-Hispanic 
Hypertension 
×Log(Ῡ)  
-0. 133*** 
(0.044) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
 
0.303 
(0.188) 
-0.043 
(0.041) 
 
Diabetes×Log(Ῡ) 
 
0.071 
(0.047) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
0.108 
(0.272) 
0.246*** 
(0.066) 
Cancer×Log(Ῡ) 
 
0.050 
(0.063) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
-0.377 
(0.256) 
-0.086 
(0.054) 
Lung×Log(Ῡ)  -0.120 
(0.099) 
-0.030** 
(0.015) 
0.438 
(0.777) 
0.151** 
(0.068) 
Heart×Log(Ῡ)  0.103 
(0.097) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
-0.241 
(0.400) 
-0.021 
(0.040) 
Stroke×Log(Ῡ) 
 
0.142** 
(0.062) 
-0.007 
(0.016) 
0.073 
(0.437) 
0.014 
(0.100) 
Arthritis×Log(Ῡ) 
 
0.086* 
(0.050) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.200 
(0.242) 
-0.022 
(0.042) 
Log(Ῡ)  0.035** 
(0.014) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
-0.443*** 
(0.086) 
-0.511*** 
(0.017) 
 
N 2,983 44,127 2,834 42,788 
R
2 
0. 57 0.14 0.654 0.088 
Implied State Dependence (β1/ β3 ) 
 
 (0.078) 
Hypertension -0.843 
[-17 to 15] 
0.485 
[-0.77 to 1.74] 
-0.181 
[-1.50 to 1.14] 
0.243 
[0.01 to 0.47] 
Diabetes 0.180 
[-4.69 to 5.05] 
-0.920 
[-2.02 to 0.18] 
0.264 
[-8.32 to 8.85] 
-0.386 
[-0.68 to -0.09] 
Cancer -0.429 
[-4.80 to 3.94] 
0.053 
[-1.13 to 1.23] 
0.445 
[-17 to 17] 
0.215 
[-0.06 to 0.49] 
Lung -0.906 
[-41 to 39] 
-0.105 
[-1.44 to 1.23] 
-0.366 
[-5.77 to 5.04] 
-0.328 
[-0.68 to 0.03] 
Heart -0.449 
[-10 to 9] 
-0.405 
[-1.24 to 0.43] 
-0.640 
[-5.27 to 3.99] 
-0.015 
[-0.22 to 0.19] 
Stroke 0.703 
[-11 to 13] 
-0.413 
[-2.09 to 1.26] 
-0.242 
[-31 to 30] 
-0.089 
[-0.59 to 0.41] 
Arthritis -0.036 
[-2.50 to 2.42] 
0.336 
[-0.83 to 1.50] 
0.410 
[-3.98 to 4.80] 
0.085 
[-0.12 to 0.29] 
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1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 4.12: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among Hispanic-
Nonhispanic  by WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – ADL 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness 
 
Utility Proxy : CESD 
 
ADL 
Hispanic Non-Hispanic Hispanic Non-Hispanic 
adl ×Log(Ῡ)  -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.030 
(0.126) 
0.009 
(0.024) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.024* 
(0.013) 
0.026*** (0.003) -0.485*** 
(0.079) 
-0.421*** 
(0.016) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 -0.043 
(53.842) 
-0.101 
(0.017) 
 
-0.268 
(0.216) 
 
-0.017 
(0.052) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
adl 1 -1.803 
(9.185) 
8.944 
(9.061) 
3.417*** 
(1.688) 
35.069 
(62.163) 
adl 2 -39.150*** 
(752.9) 
8.122 
(7.118) 
9.612*** 
(19.787) 
60.568 
(164.863) 
adl 3 2.320 
(1.471) 
14.378 
(27.499) 
5.443*** 
(4.480) 
-34.723 
(65.070) 
adl 4 6.984*** 
(504.8) 
28.351 
(80.468) 
14.691*** 
(65.926) 
-373.854 
(7265.6) 
adl 5 1.750 
(1.616) 
7.781* 
(4.549) 
-0.811 
(6.738) 
47.759*** 
(154.455) 
N 3,006 45,294 3,001 45,295 
R
2 
0.185 0.038 0.114 0.221 
Within Person 
Std Dev of 
ADL 
0.641 0.586   
State Dependence σ(β1/β3) 
 
 0.629*** 
(0.012) 
0.567*** 
(0.003) 
0.815*** 
(0.073) 
0.766*** 
(0.017) 
 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 4.12: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among Hispanic-
Nonhispanic  by WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – IADL 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness 
 
Utility Proxy : CESD 
IADL wide Hispanic Non-Hispanic Hispanic Non-Hispanic 
IADL ×Log(Ῡ) 
 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
 
0.120 
(0.082) 
0.104*** 
(0.027) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.035*** 
(0.014) 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
-
0.565*** 
(0.078) 
-0.500*** 
(0.016) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 -0.505 
(1.406) 
0.493 
(0.152) 
 
-0.311 
(0.220) 
 
-0.149** 
(0.043) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
IADL 1 -9.916 
(19.483) 
5.528*** 
(2.106) 
41.956 
(1700) 
28.790 
(42.392) 
IADL 2 237.326 
(40514) 
8.208*** 
(4.055) 
1.265 
(1.063) 
11.266*** 
(4.813) 
IADL 3 1.768 
(2.466) 
371.423 
(22571) 
3.439 
(2.248) 
58.228 
(225.628) 
IADL 4 1.540*** 
(0.531) 
3.381*** 
(1.127) 
1.877*** 
(0.722) 
7.674* 
(4.043) 
IADL 5 3.130*** 
(0.869) 
5.921** 
(3.042) 
19.328 
(177.778) 
5.824*** 
(1.853) 
N 2,905 43,407 2,945 43,698 
R
2 
0.843 0.160 0.393 0.175 
Within Person 
Std Dev of 
IADL 
0.641 0.586   
State Dependence σ(β1/β3) 
 
 0.629*** 
(0.011) 
0.570*** 
(0.003) 
0.718*** 
(0.076) 
0.742*** 
(0.018) 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 4.13:  Non-linear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of Utility Heterogeneity among Hispanic  and 
Non-Hispanic using HRS 1992-2008. 
Utility Proxy : 
Happiness 
Hispanic, Non-
Hispanic utility 
heterogeneity 
With number 
of diseases 
 
Hispanic, Non-
Hispanic utility 
heterogeneity 
With ADLs 
 
Hispanic, Non-
Hispanic utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
ADLs 
 
Hispanic, Non-
Hispanic utility 
heterogeneity 
With IADLs 
 
Hispanic, Non-
Hispanic utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
IADLs 
 
Total 
Disparity 
 
1.09*** 
(0.011) 
1.08*** 
(0.011) 
1.08*** 
(0.011) 
1.08*** 
(0.011) 
1.08*** 
(0.011) 
Portion due to 
Difference in 
Coefficients 
 
1.02*** 
(0.003) 
1.03*** 
(0.003) 
1.03*** 
(0.003) 
1.03*** 
(0.003) 
1.03*** 
(0.003) 
Portion due to 
Difference in 
Endowments 
1.06*** 
(0.011) 
1.05*** 
(0.011) 
1.05*** 
(0.011) 
1.05*** 
(0.011) 
1.05*** 
(0.011) 
 
Health 
Indicator 
1.000*** 
(0.001) 
1.01*** 
(0.001) 
1.01*** 
(0.001) 
1.00*** 
(0.0007) 
1.01*** 
(0.001) 
 
Log Income 
1.02*** 
(0.002) 
1.02*** 
(0.002) 
1.02*** 
(0.002) 
1.02*** 
(0.002) 
1.02*** 
(0.002) 
 
Age 
1.003*** 
(0.007) 
1.00*** 
(0.0007) 
1.00*** 
(0.0007) 
1.00*** 
(0.0007) 
1.00*** 
(0.0007) 
 
Race 
1.000 
(0.001) 
-0.10 
(0.001) 
-0.10 
(0.001) 
1.000 
(0.001) 
-0.10 
(0.001) 
 
Risk Attitude 
1.000*** 
(0.001) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0003) 
1.000*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.10*** 
(0.0003) 
 
Region 
1.000 
(0.001) 
-0.10 
(0.001) 
-0.10 
(0.001) 
1.000 
(0.001) 
-0.10 
(0.001) 
 
Marital Status 
1.000* 
(0.0005) 
1.00 
(0.0005) 
1.00 
(0.0005) 
1.001 
(0.0006) 
1.00 
(0.0005) 
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Table 4.14:  Linear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of Utility Heterogeneity among 
Hispanic  and Non-Hispanic using HRS 1992-2008. 
Utility Proxy : 
Happiness 
Hispanic, Non-
Hispanic utility 
heterogeneity 
With number of 
diseases 
 
Hispanic, Non-
Hispanic utility 
heterogeneity 
With ADLs 
 
Hispanic, Non-
Hispanic utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
ADLs 
 
Hispanic, Non-
Hispanic utility 
heterogeneity 
With IADLs 
 
Hispanic, Non-
Hispanic utility 
heterogeneity 
With five 
IADLs 
 
 
Total Disparity 
 
 
-0.649*** 
(0.062) 
 
-0.649*** 
(0.062) 
 
-0.649*** 
(0.062) 
 
-0.649*** 
(0.062) 
 
-0.632*** 
(0.063) 
Portion due to 
Difference in 
Coefficients 
 
-0.295*** 
(0.022) 
-0.421*** 
(0.025) 
-0.419*** 
(0.027) 
-0.431*** 
(0.022) 
-0.391*** 
(0.025) 
Portion due to 
Difference in 
Endowments 
-0.354*** 
(0.061) 
-0.228*** 
(0.059) 
-0.230*** 
(0.058) 
-0.217*** 
(0.061) 
-0.241*** 
(0.061) 
Health 
Indicator 
 
0.036*** 
(0.010) 
-0.088*** 
(0.015) 
-0.112*** 
(0.018) 
-0.046*** 
(0.010) 
-0.055*** 
(0.015) 
Log Income -0.299*** 
(0.014) 
-0.299*** 
(0.013) 
-0.278*** 
(0.013) 
-0.345*** 
(0.015) 
-0.300*** 
(0.014) 
Age -0.024*** 
(0.004) 
-0.024*** 
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
-0.027*** 
(0.005) 
-0.031*** 
(0.005) 
Risk Attitude 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Region -0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Marital Status -0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
Race -0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.00006 
(0.007) 
-0.0008 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
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Figure 4.1: Negative vs. Positive State Dependence 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table 2A1: Risk Preference Categories: 
 
Category X Accepted X Rejected Risk tolerance range Risk Aversion Range 
1 None 1/10      0 to 0.13  ∞ to 7.7 
2 1/10 1/5      0.13 to 0.27  7.7 to 3.7 
3 1/5 1/3      0.27 to 0.50  3.7 to 2 
4 1/3 1/2    0.50 to 1.0  2 to 1 
5 1/2 3/4    1.0 to 3.27  1 to 0.3 
6 3/4 None   3.27 to  
 
0.3 to 0 
 
 
Note: This categorization is also shown in Table 1 of Kimball, et al. (2008) 
We collapse the above six categories into three: most risk averse (1, 2), middle risk averse (3, 
4), and least risk averse (5, 6). 
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Appendix2 B.  Robustness Checks 
 
Table 2A2.  OLS Estimates with Clustered Standard Errors  
Variable                   Category Income Risk Nonfatal Fatal 
Risk Aversion             Medium   -0.043** 
(0.018) 
-0.100 
(0.072) 
-0.069 
(0.056) 
                                      Most -0.039** 
(0.017) 
0.156** 
(0.069) 
0.062 
(0.052) 
Race                              Black 0.056*** 
(0.020) 
0.342*** 
(0.078) 
0.054 
(0.063) 
 Other 0.030 
(0.023) 
0.184** 
(0.090) 
0.078 
(0.070) 
Degree                   High School 0.0002 
(0.014) 
-0.719*** 
(0.060) 
-0.518*** 
(0.045) 
                                     College -0.019 
(0.015) 
-1.087*** 
(0.061) 
-0.802*** 
(0.054) 
                                Graduate -0.016 
(0.012) 
-1.138*** 
(0.046) 
-1.071*** 
(0.043) 
                                       Other 0.005 
(0.066) 
-1.243*** 
(0.121) 
-0.780*** 
(0.144) 
Family Wealth       Average -0.041** 
(0.019) 
0.093 
(0.087) 
0.096 
(0.060) 
                                   Poor -0.0403* 
(0.021) 
0.069 
(0.096) 
0.094 
(0.068) 
                                  Varied -0.028 
(0.054) 
0.298 
(0.254) 
0.155 
(0.182) 
Time Horizon         Next Year -0.055** 
(0.023) 
-0.111 
(0.096) 
-0.007 
(0.077) 
                              Next Few Years -0.064*** 
(0.019) 
-0.202** 
(0.083) 
-0.009 
(0.065) 
                            Next 5-10 Years -0.048** 
(0.019) 
-0.130* 
(0.077) 
0.0002 
(0.062) 
                           Longer than 10 yrs -0.062*** 
(0.022) 
-0.104 
(0.093) 
0.055 
(0.073) 
Age 0.003*** 
(0.0009) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.00003 
(0.003) 
Marital status     Previously Married  0.012 
(0.016) 
0.219*** 
(0.067) 
0.137*** 
(0.052) 
                                 Never Married 0.053* 
(0.029) 
0.034 
(0.114) 
-0.119 
(0.087) 
# Observations 1,873   
Notes: Clustered Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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Table 3A1: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among whites-blacks  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – ADL 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness 
 
Utility Proxy : CESD 
ADLWA Female Male Female Male 
adlw ×Log(Ῡ) 
 
-0.027*** 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
 
-0.013 
(0.045) 
-0.038 
(0.046) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.040*** 
(0.004) 
0.022*** 
(0.004) 
-0.512*** 
(0.023) 
-0.437*** 
(0.023) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 
adlw -0.389 
(0.283) 
0.115 
(0.365) 
-0.048 
(0.082) 
0.117 
(0.124) 
Ratio of margins 
adlw 0.964*** 
(0.006) 
0.969*** 
(0.006) 
1.359*** 
(0.028) 
1.375*** 
(0.026) 
Ratio of margins with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
adlw 1 0.961*** 
(0.009) 
0.973*** 
(0.009) 
1.445*** 
(0.044) 
1.342*** 
(0.041) 
adlw 2 0.925*** 
(0.015) 
0.949*** 
(0.015) 
1.723*** 
(0.073) 
1.738*** 
(0.070) 
adlw 3 0.896*** 
(0.029) 
0.872*** 
(0.029) 
1.842*** 
(0.140) 
2.260*** 
(0.131) 
N 26,204 22,116 26,249 22,158 
R
2 
0.432 0.739 0.408 0.554 
Within Person 
Std Dev of 
ADLWA 
0.398 0.382   
Ratio of margins σ(β1/β3) 
 
 0.384*** 
(0.002) 
0.370*** 
(0.002) 
0.541*** 
(0.011) 
0.525*** 
(0.010) 
 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard errors for 
diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, census region, 
marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 3A2: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among whites-blacks  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – Number of Diseases 
 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness 
 
Utility Proxy : CESD 
IADL Female Male Female Male 
iadl ×Log(Ῡ) 
 
-0.055*** 
(0.012) 
-0.022* 
(0.012) 
 
0.253*** 
(0.055) 
0.061 
(0.051) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.040*** 
(0.004) 
0.025*** 
(0.004) 
-0.545*** 
(0.023) 
-0.433*** 
(0.024) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 
iadl -0.650 
(0.274) 
-0.752 
(0.400) 
-0.190 
(0.113) 
-0.044 
(0.137) 
Ratio of margins 
iadl 0.975*** 
(0.007) 
0.962*** 
(0.007) 
1.223*** 
(0.035) 
1.275*** 
(0.032) 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
iadl 1 0.958*** 
(0.011) 
0.955*** 
(0.011) 
1.368*** 
(0.058) 
1.339*** 
(0.049) 
iadl 2 0.984*** 
(0.022) 
0.957*** 
(0.021) 
1.340*** 
(0.108) 
1.465*** 
(0.098) 
iadl 3 0.919*** 
(0.035) 
0.864*** 
(0.032) 
1.474*** 
(0.172) 
1.806*** 
(0.150) 
N 26,204 22,115 26,249 22,157 
R
2 
0.678 0.764 0.698 0.728 
Within Person 
Std Dev of 
Num_Dis 
0.355 0.357   
State Dependence σ(β1/β3) 
 
 0.346*** 
(0.003) 
0.344*** 
(0.002) 
0.434*** 
(0.013) 
0.455*** 
(0.011) 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard 
errors for diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, 
census region, marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being 
reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 4A1: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among whites-blacks  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – ADL 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness 
 
Utility Proxy : CESD 
 
Health 
Indicator : 
ADLWA 
 
White 
 
Black 
 
White 
 
Black 
adlw ×Log(Ῡ) 0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
-0.047 
(0.035) 
-0.071 
(0.070) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.021*** 
(0.003) 
0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.410*** 
(0.018) 
-0.589*** 
(0.049) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 
 -0.370 
(0.222) 
-0.049 
(0.046) 
 
0.015 
(0.078) 
0.068 
(0.125) 
 
Ratio of Margins with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
adlw 1 -2.403 
(4.201) 
0.697*** 
(0.278) 
-13.600 
(36.759) 
0.757 
(0.491) 
adlw 2 6.345 
(14.819) 
0.877*** 
(0.385) 
-7.933 
(11.250) 
203.139 
(19038) 
adlw 3 2.608*** 
(0.677) 
1.562*** 
(0.280) 
22.985 
(212.610) 
-1.089 
(5.995) 
N 40,667 6,773 40,734 6,787 
R
2 
0.660 0.220 0.534 0.223 
Within Person 
Std Dev adlwa 
0.382 0.478   
Ratio of Margins σ(β1/β3) 
 
 0.386*** 
(0.003) 
0.382*** 
(0.007) 
0.544*** 
(0.016) 
0.481*** 
(0.038) 
 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard 
errors for diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, 
census region, marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being 
reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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Table 4A2: Health State Dependence Heterogeneity of utility among whites-blacks  by 
WLS (Probability weights) : Dependent Variable – Number of Diseases 
 
 
 Utility Proxy : Happiness 
 
Utility Proxy : CESD 
 
Health 
Indicator : 
IADL 
 
White 
 
Black 
 
White 
 
Black 
iadl ×Log(Ῡ) -0.032*** 
(0.009) 
 
-0.027 
(0.040) 
 
0.036 
(0.042) 
0.179 
(0.129) 
 
Log(Ῡ)  0.033*** 
(0.003) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.455*** 
(0.018) 
-0.716*** 
(0.052) 
 
Implied State Dependence (β1/β3) 
 
 
 -0.761*** 
(0.293) 
-1.071* 
(0.614) 
 
-0.125 
(0.102) 
-0.201 
(0.262) 
 
Ratio of Margins with Number of Diseases Detailed 
 
iadl 1 2.722 
(2.909) 
2.707 
(1.758) 
-3.482 
(12.235) 
3.870*** 
(1.037) 
iadl 2 25.938 
(135.324) 
3.331*** 
(0.128) 
1.653 
(1.303) 
2.811*** 
(0.118) 
iadl 3 3.085*** 
(1.114) 
4.290*** 
(0.814) 
-6.821 
(26.353) 
4.212*** 
(0.232) 
N 40,666 6,774 40,733 6,788 
R
2 
0.764 0.350 0.768 0.374 
Within Person 
Std Dev iadl 
0.344 0.412   
Ratio of Margins σ(β1/β3) 
 
 0.346*** 
(0.004) 
0.361*** 
(0.013) 
0.441*** 
(0.018) 
0.417*** 
(0.093) 
Notes:   
1. Regression uses fixed effects OLS in a panel setting using weights and reports robust standard 
errors for diseases and interaction terms. Time and individual fixed effects, risk attitude, age, 
census region, marital status, dummy for race, and ethnicity were used as controls but not being 
reported here. 
2. β3 is estimated from fixed effects estimates of the previous regression.  
3. State dependence is estimated from the ratio of interaction term (β1) and coefficient of permanent 
income (β3). 
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ESSAYS ON IMPACT OF RISK PREFERENCE ON HEALTH AND 
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by 
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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
This dissertation re-examines Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data in order to 
ascertain whether there exists behavioral heterogeneity among people regarding health risk as 
compared to that of financial risk as well as whether there exists racial-ethnic and gender 
heterogeneity in the health state dependence of marginal utility.  Given heterogeneous risk 
and time preferences of individuals, this study investigates the impact of those preferences on 
sorting into occupations and industries using various measures of job risk.  I construct three  
measures of risk across jobs, cross-categorized by occupation and industry: a fatal injury rate, 
non-fatal injury and illness rate, and a measure of inter-person income variability.  Using 
these measures, I analyze how risk and time preference of an individual affects his 
occupational choice.  This study finds that there are different domains of risk and that 
individuals do not think of these in the same way.  Using Health and Retirement Study data, I 
find that there exists a behavioral inconsistency in health risks versus income risk. This 
dissertation advises against the use of health risk proxy for making inferences about financial 
risk. 
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This dissertation then examines the heterogeneity in health dependence of utility and 
contingent upon the findings of heterogeneity, it examines the factors contributing to utility 
heterogeneity. To examine this empirically, I begin with theoretical and empirical models 
used by Finkelstein, et al. (2011) relaxing the assumptions of those models to allow for 
differential effects by race, gender and ethnicity.  Using happiness as a utility proxy and 
objective health measures in our baseline model, I find strong evidence of  heterogeneity in 
health state dependence of utility among males and females, hispanic and non-hispanic and 
white, and black; not only in seven objective health conditions but also functionality 
limitations; not only by using happiness as a utility proxy but also with CES-D score. Since, 
there is slight evidence of heterogeneity in the health state dependence of utility among 
different health states, the policies like Medicare, and Medicaid would have varying impact 
on people depending upon race, ethnicity and gender.  
The non-linear B-O decomposition of utility unfolds that the significant contributors 
towards the explained gender, racial and ethnic gap in  utility proxy  (happiness and CES-D 
Score) are:  marital status, number of diseases,  log adjusted income, risk attitudes and 
ethnicity. Approximately 80 percent of the gender utility gap and 100 percent race utility gap 
is explained by the endowment effect.  Thus, this dissertation reaffirms the findings of 
Halliday (2008) that  there may be larger potential gains to identifying as well as targeting 
factors that influence individual heterogeneity since the health state dependence of utility is 
mostly driven by individual characteristics, as has been found to be the case in B-O 
decomposition of utility in the current study. 
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